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The Security and Foreign Policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran: An Offensive Realism 
Perspective 
 
Bledar Prifti 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
This study argues that security and foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
is mainly driven by the main principles of the Offensive Realism theory of international 
relations. While the Iranian political system is considered a theocratic system, based on 
the Islamic Shi‘a ideology, its survival is defined as the ultimate ideology—an ideology 
that is paramount to any other ideology. Iran‘s security and foreign policy is determined 
and shaped by its need to survive in an anarchic international system. Iran‘s cooperation 
with ―two Satans‖, Israel and the United States, during the Iran-Iraq war demonstrates 
that the ultimate ideology of survival dominates over any other ideological 
predisposition. In addition, the lack of a supranational government and the fear about the 
intentions of other states make Iran aware of the need to rely on self-help. Iran has also 
realized that the best way to limit threats to its survival would be maximizing its relative 
military power and becoming a regional hegemony. Furthermore, a formidable military 
power would provide Iran with a new status in regional and global politics, deterrence 
power over any possible attack from other great powers, and bargaining power over 
regional and global matters. In order to enhance its military (conventional and nuclear) 
iv 
arsenal, Iran has established ―strategic relations‖ with its historic enemy, Russia. 
In its quest to advance its military capabilities and avoid threats to its sovereignty, Iran 
sided with Christian states, against its Muslim brothers, during the Russia-Chechnya and 
Armenia-Azerbaijan conflicts. Moreover, the Islamic state is aware of the fact that its 
paramount goals can be achieved by relying on precise rational strategies. In order to 
validate these claims, this study analyzes Iran‘s policy during the Iran-Iraq war and 
Iran‘s policy toward Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, the Russian-Chechen conflict, and 
the U.S. invasion of Iran. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 After the sudden and prominent success of the Islamic Revolution in deposing the 
Shah‘s regime, and the coming into power of Grand Ayatollah Sayyed Ruhollah 
Khomeini in 1979, Iran's political behavior has had its own trajectory and traits that have 
bewildered not only the foreign governments but also the political scientists who 
endeavor to provide scientific explanations to such political behavior. This rapid and 
radical change of the political system and its institutions has had an enormous impact on 
how the security and foreign policy of the new Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) was to be 
conducted by the new Iranian power elite in the years to come. After decades of close 
relationships and alliance with the United States and the West, Iran became the symbol of 
anti-Americanism and one of the most serious challengers of the American interests in 
the Middle East. Iran‘s new political system demanded for a new era of political relations 
and for a new position of Iran in both the regional and global arena. While for many 
states the problem is to separate state from religion, for most governments and 
international relations experts the problem is to separate speeches from actions, or words 
from deeds. Iran was one of the countries whose propaganda, or political rhetoric, rarely 
matched its actions. 
 Following the characteristics of the new Islamic state, many would think and 
believe that Iran's security and foreign policy would be based on religious rules and 
predispositions. Shi‟a Islam became the leading anti-Shah ideology during the revolution 
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and received much of its potency by promulgating a fierce opposition against the policies 
of the United States and other Western powers. It culminated in Khomeini‘s speech of 
November 1979 when the Supreme Leader flamboyantly demonized and named the 
United States as the Great Satan (Beeman 1983, 191-192). Later, he would call Israel the 
Small Satan. However, this assumption was soon to be shaken by the Iran-Contra Affair, 
which became public in November of 1986. The affair consisted of systematic and 
intensive dealings between Iran, on the one side, and the United States and Israel, on the 
other side. The Iran-Contra scandal happened in a time when Iran was fighting for its 
survival against a very aggressive Iraq. In addition, the Russian-Chechen conflict 
revealed more of the nature of Iran‘s security and foreign policy. Iran's pro-Russian 
position was exercised in a time when Iran so desperately needed military and military-
led technological support to confront its adversaries, to survive, and to increase its 
influence in the region. Iran‘s security and foreign policy toward the Armenia-Azerbaijan 
conflict and the U.S. invasion of Iraq are two other cases that reveal the real nature of 
Iran‘s security and foreign policy. 
 These events have brought to the minds of many scholars questions about the real 
principles that guide the Iranian security and foreign policy. Is the Iranian security and 
foreign policy guided by religious predispositions or by its need to survive in an anarchic 
international system? Thus, among others, the central question that this study endeavors 
to answers is: Is the Iranian security and foreign policy guided by ideology or by the 
reality of current international system of politics? 
 This study endeavors to provide answers to the following questions related to ―the 
words and deeds‖ of Iran‘s security and foreign policy: What drives Iran‘s security and 
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foreign policy? Why does Iran behave the way it does? What are the paradoxes of Iran‘s 
security and foreign policy? Is Iran‘s security and foreign policy driven by ideology and 
religious predispositions or by rationalism? Does Iran really intend to ―wipe out‖ the state 
of Israel? Will Iran build a nuclear weapon if the opportunity is given? What does all this 
mean for the international system of politics? What are some of the main challenges that 
the international system faces today when it comes to Iran‘s security and foreign policy?  
 Regardless of the responses to the above questions, there cannot be a single 
answer that can provide a comprehensive explanation of the Iranian security and foreign 
policy. There is no theory that explains everything.  
 Nevertheless, there are always theories that provide a better explanation or 
definition of the political reality. Following this assumption, this study endeavors to 
explain that Iran‘s security and foreign policy is shaped by the nature of the international 
system of politics, as defined under the principles of the Offensive Realism Theory of 
international relations (Mearsheimer 2001). The theory holds that the states are the main 
actors of the international system. In addition, the international system lacks a central 
government and is in a permanent state of anarchy. States also possess certain military 
powers, which make them capable of hurting or even destroying one another. Moreover, 
states are suspicious of the intentions of the other states. Finally, the top-priority goal of 
the states is their survival. The survival can be assured only when there is no other power 
in the system capable of threatening the existence of a state, meaning that the state has 
reached the status of hegemony.  
 In order to ensure their survival in this anarchic system, states rely on self-help 
and calculate their interests and powers in conjunction with the interests and powers of 
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the other states. Fear and assurance both lead to permanent change of status. States fear 
each other and seek to ensure their existence by eliminating any real or perceived threat. 
As such, states can hardly accept their status quo, unless they become hegemony. 
Survival in an anarchic international system of politics is the only status quo ideology—
the ultimate ideology that cannot be changed for any other ideology. One, being a person 
or a state, can trade one‘s ideology for another. Nevertheless, one cannot trade its 
(his/her) existence for an ideology. If it happens, what would be the point or what would 
be left of it (his/her)? Nothing existential!  
 However, this study does not claim that there exist a dichotomical relationship 
between the Islamic ideology and offensive realism. Nor does it claim that one 
perspective or another can explain everything related to Iran's security and foreign policy. 
While Shi‘ism may have significant impact on the Iran‘s internal policies, in the 
international arena, Iran is forced to comply with Machiavelli‘s reason d‟état. The main 
argument of this study is to provide an adequate and efficient analysis that would indicate 
that survival is the ultimate ideology of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iran seeks to ensure 
its survival in this anarchic system by increasing its powers vis-a-vis the powers of the 
other states. This main goal of the Islamic Republic is incorporated in and explained by 
the Offensive Realism Theory of the international relation. 
The methodology that will be used to test the theory of offensive realism consists 
of multiple case studies, which encompass the most important events during the life of 
the Islamic Republic. Case study methodology is considered by many prominent political 
scientists as an ―empirical inquiry that (1) investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real-life context; when (2) the boundaries between phenomenon and context are 
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not clearly evident; and in which (3) multiple sources of evidence are used‖ (Johnson, 
Joslyn, and Reynolds 2001, 143). Johnson et al also claim that case study design clearly 
identifies political theories that would provide an accurate explanation of the events 
incorporated in that case study.  
As such, this study argues that the principles of the offensive realism theory 
provide an explanation to the events presented through the case studies. A multiple case 
study approach will be used in order to provide stronger explanatory power of the theory. 
The use of multiple case studies will provide the opportunity to replicate findings and to 
repeatedly test the theory for several times. This approach will lead to a higher reliability 
of data and procedures implemented to test the theory. Case studies that will be used to 
test the theory include: (1) the Iran-Contra Affair, (2) the Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict, 
(3) the Russian-Chechen conflict, and (4) the U.S. Invasion of Iraq. 
 Emphasizing the importance of applying a pure and rigorous theoretical approach 
will help the scientific community and government entities not only to have a profound 
understanding of Iran‘s security and foreign policy but also to make educated conjectures 
about Iran‘s behavior and intentions in the future. Thus, the significance of the study rests 
not only on the emphasis that it puts on the theoretical and methodological framework but 
also on the importance that the result may have in defining and predicting the behavior of 
the Iranian government in the future. 
 In order to test the theory and provide reasonable and scholarly support for its 
claims, this study will analyze the main elements that have contributed to building Iran‘s 
current security and foreign policy. Without analyzing and considering all these elements, 
it would be impossible to reach a final conclusion about what this study aims to explain. 
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First, this study will analyze (but will not argue about) Iran‘s historical elements such as 
the Iranian exceptionalism demonstrated throughout the history of Iran, conquests and 
exploitations from foreign powers, and major events that have shaped the nature of Iran‘s 
politics. The Iranian exceptionalism will consider the Iranians perception of themselves 
from the era of Cyrus the Great to the modern times of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi 
and Grand Ayatollah Khomeini. In addition, foreign conquests from foreign powers will 
include a period of conquests starting with the conquest from Alexander the Great, the 
existential threats from Mongols, systematic conquests and exploitations from the 
Russians and British, and the unexpected attack from Saddam Hussein in 1980. This 
study also will continue with an analysis of the main events that have played a crucial 
role in shaping Iran‘s current policies. These events will include the 1953 coup d‘état 
against Mohammad Mossadeq and the Iran-Iraq war.  
 Second, this study will make a thorough analysis of the 1979 Islamic Revolution. 
Due to its crucial impact on defining the nature of Iran‘s politics and its current power 
structure, this event is analyzed separately from other historical events. The chapter under 
the Islamic Revolution will cover major actors and factors such as the Constitutional 
Movement of 1906, the White Revolution of the Shah in 1960, the June uprising in 1963, 
and other main social and political entities. The study will continue with a separate 
chapter on the life, ideas, and the work of the Grand Ayatollah Khomeini, the leader of 
the Islamic Revolution. Khomeini formulated the velayat-e faqih doctrine and gave Iran 
the foundations of the Islamic state. Understanding the velayat-e faqih is crucial to 
defining Iran‘s current power politics and its informal power structure. In addition, this 
study will provide an analysis of the Islamic Constitution and the informal and formal 
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power structure of Iran. Its goal is to divulge the harbor where the real power rests, or 
who decides what, when, where, and how. Finally, after going through all these elements, 
the study will then conclude with the theoretical approach and case studies to test the 
theory. 
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Chapter Two 
A History of Iran 
As mentioned previously, we cannot have a coherent observation of the security 
and foreign policy of the modern Iran without analyzing first certain historical factors and 
events that have continuously shaped the process of the political and social development 
of Iran throughout history. First, the geostrategic position of Iran (Figure 1.) has played a 
significant role in shaping Iran‘s history (Iran stands for Aryan, used by Indo-European 
peoples who migrated southeast before 1000 B.C.) and its interaction with other states in 
the region. Iran borders the Persian Gulf (with its oil richness) to the south, Armenia and 
Azerbaijan, and the Caspian Sea to the north, Afghanistan and Pakistan to the east, and 
Turkey and Iraq to the west. This geographic position makes Iran a very important route 
for international trade and geopolitical strategy. Iran‘s prominent role as a trade 
geostrategic state dates back during the era of the Sassanid Dynasty and the Silk Road, 
which connected China with the West. It continues today through the oil pipes by 
connecting Iran with China, Europe, Pakistan, and many other states around the world. It 
is this geographical location that has shaped the Iran‘s history and relations with other 
states and has given Iran a strategic geopolitical status in the international system of 
politics. 
 In addition, the history of Iran can be divided into three main historical blocs. It is 
important to emphasize that each of the blocs should not be considered separated from 
the others but as a result of the interconnection between each other. First, the history of 
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Iran emphasizes what many scholars consider the Iranian Exceptionalism, which is not 
that different from the well-known phrase of the American Exceptionalism. The second 
main bloc of the Iranian history incorporates events that deal with systematic conquests 
and exploitation of Iran throughout its history from other foreign powers. The third main 
bloc of the Iranian history analyzes the birth and the influence of Shi‟a religion on Iran‘s 
cultural, social, and political life. This historical bloc will be discussed in details 
separately due to its significant role in shaping the Iran‘s image in the world politics. 
 
Figure 1. The Map of Iran. Source: University of Texas—Produced by the CIA 
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The Iranian Exceptionalism 
The Iranian exceptionalism is a term used in this study to describe perceptiveness, 
feelings, and beliefs of the Iranian people and their leaders that their nation (Persia or 
Iran) holds a unique place in history and among other nations. Sadegh Zibakalam (n.d., 
85), a professor at the Tehran University, claims that ―the Iranian ‗exceptionalism‘ rests 
on two main pillars: (1) the negation of the present world order and (2) the belief in the 
inherent superiority of the Iranian civilization‖. The notion of the Iranian exceptionalism 
dates back during the reign of Cyrus the Great (600 B.C.—530 B.C.), the founder of the 
Persian Empire and the first king of the Achaemenian Dynasty. Under his three decades 
of leadership, the Persian Empire (―Persia‖ is the Greek name for Iran) became one of the 
largest empires that the world has ever seen throughout its history. Cyrus the Great 
became the epitome of a legendary military leader by conquering in a short time three 
other empires—Median Empire, Lydian Empire, and the Babylonian Empire. In addition, 
he laid the foundations of a successful model of a centralized administration and the 
principle of accountability before his people. 
But the legacy of Cyrus the Great would not be accurate and complete without 
addressing the contribution that he made on religious issues. After seizing the kingdom, 
Cyrus the Great established Zoroastrianism as a monotheistic religion whose principles 
emphasized the concept of the social justice and the notions of the final judgment and 
immortality. He also emphasized and exercised the Zoroastrian principle of the just ruler. 
In addition, Cyrus the Great considered himself an instrument of God on earth, and his 
right to rule came directly from the will of the Supreme God. From Zoroastrianism, 
Cyrus the Great took the notion of the Supreme God, which he thought had entrusted him 
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with the task and the legitimacy of uniting people of the earth in one single kingdom of 
peace and justice. This belief is tantamount to the belief expressed in the Manifest 
Destiny of the new-born American state. The Manifest Destiny was used by many U.S. 
politicians to justify their belief that God had provided the United States with the task of 
expanding their values throughout the Western hemisphere. Cyrus also implemented 
different religious policies and allowed a diversity of religious practices and beliefs. The 
most notable contribution is his Edict of Restoration which brought to an end the 
Babylonian Captivity of the Jewish people. 
Darius the Great (549 B.C.—486 B.C.) is another Persian leader who based his 
leadership on the legacy of Cyrus the Great and elevated the Persian identity to higher 
stages. Like Cyrus, Darius the Great believed in Ahura Mazda and Zoroastrianism. In 
addition, he organized a highly professional army and an administrative system which 
served in the future as a model for the Roman Empire. Moreover, Darius created a legal 
system based on justice, principles, and the moral code of Zoroastrianism. The main 
contribution that Darius brought to the Persian civilization was the building of 
Persepolis, which was considered as the main site to celebrate the grandeur of the 
Persian Empire and the symbol of the Persian uniqueness in the world.  
Darius the Great was succeeded by Xerxes the Great (485–465 BC), the last king 
of the Achaemenian Dynasty. Xerxes the Great followed the leadership of Cyrus and 
Darius the Great by emphasizing military capabilities and strategies as the main ways for 
Persian expansion and security in the world.  
In 332 B.C., Persia was conquered by another historical leader—Alexander the 
Great. Soon after the conquest, Alexander ordered the Persepolis burned, an action that 
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he regretted in the future. The reason for him to order the destruction of Persepolis was 
―to take from Persians their sense of self‖ and their identity (Mackey 1996, 31). The next 
dynasty to govern Persia after the Greek conquest was the Sassanid Dynasty, which 
reined between 224 C.E. and 651C.E. During the Sassanid Dynasty, trade flourished and 
the Iranian economy prospered more than ever before. The Silk Road between China and 
the West and the geostrategic location of Persia made Persians prosperous and feel that 
―they could go anywhere and do everything‖. 
In addition, the occupation of Iran by the Arab forces in 651 C.E. and the spread 
of Islam throughout Iran revealed again the nature of Iranian exceptionalism. This 
occupation also divided the history of Iran in two major timeframes: the Islamic and Pre-
Islamic history. Islam itself was divided in two major sects: Sunni and Shi‟a Islam. The 
Iranians embraced Islam but never relinquished their own identity.   
In 1501, during the Safavid Empire, Ismail Shah declared the Twelver Shi‟ism as 
the official religion of Iran. This came after prolonged conflicts and wars among different 
Muslim groups about the interpretation of Koran and the succession of the Prophet. For 
Sunnis, the successor of the Prophet does not need to be a descendant of the Prophet and 
―would need no exceptional spiritual qualities but would merely have to be an exemplary 
Muslim who could ably and virtuously direct the religious and political affairs of the 
community‖ (Nasr 2007, 35). On the other hand, Shi‘as argued that the successor should 
be a descendant of the Prophet and should possess special spiritual qualities. While 
Sunnis chose Abu Bakr (a close friend and the father-in-law of the Prophet), Shi‘as chose 
Ali to be the successor of the Prophet. Ali was a cousin, ―virtual adoptive son‖, the son-
in-law, and a protector of the Prophet. He became the fourth Caliph of the Muslim 
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community and was later killed in confrontation with his Sunnis counterpart, who 
established the Umayyad dynasty. This event permanently changed the path of Shi‘ism. 
Shi‘a religion became consolidated and broadly-accepted by the people after the battle of 
Karbala in 680 C.E when soldiers of the second Umayyad caliph, Yazid I, massacred 
Ali‘s son Hussein along with seventy-two of his supporters and family members (2007, 
40).  
However, the conversion of Iranians to Shi‟ism cannot be considered accidental 
but as a choice through which the Iranians decided to retain Islam, and at the same time, 
to shape it in such a way that would allow Iranians preserve their identity and values. Iran 
accepted Shi‟a Islam because it was a mirror of the Persian culture and of the Iranian 
experience. The Iranians saw Shi‘a martyrdom of Ali and Hussein as shadows of 
themselves. In addition, Shi‟a Islam and the lives of Ali and Hussein showed Iranians that 
they, themselves, were humiliated and defeated throughout the history in their quest for 
their rights and the deepest convictions (Mackey 1996, 85). The Iranians found in Ali the 
figure of the ―just ruler‖ that they had seen previously in Cyrus, Darius, and Xerxes the 
Great. Moreover, the Iranians found in Shi‘ism their Zoroastrianist hope for the return of 
the savior who would restore justice on earth (the return of the Hidden Imam—the 
Mahdi). 
However, the real and the vivid symbol of the Iranian identity and exceptionalism 
were brought back to life through the Ferdowsi‘s work Shahnameb (around 1000 C.E.). 
Many scholars consider Shahnameb a masterpiece that best expose the grandeur of 
Persepolis as a symbol of the Iranian identity. For Sandra Mackey, Shahnameb ―evokes a 
whole range of images—heroism, justice, national glory, and tragic defeat—that Iranians 
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as a people holds essential to their culture and to their identity‖ (Mackey 1996, 63). 
Shahnameb awakened what Mackey calls ―the soul of the Iranians‖, and its result was a 
long hymn to honor, valor, wisdom, and patriotism (1996, 63). It was a perfect blending 
and exposure of the identity and values the Pre-Islamic Iran with the Islamic Iran. It 
revived the memories of the Iranians and brought into light the Iranian exceptionalism. 
Going back to the Sadegh Zibakalam‘s pillars of Iranian exceptionalism, besides 
the ―belief in the inherent superiority of Iranian civilization‖, we may realize the traits of 
this Iranian exceptionalism in the negation of the present world order by the Iranian 
politicians and governments and the desire to bring back the glory of the Persian Empire. 
One example for this case includes the celebration of the 2,500 years of the Persian 
Empire by Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi (1919-1980; and the Shah of Iran 1941-1979) 
next to the ruins of Persepolis. This celebration of the Persian Empire and the place 
chosen for it tell us that the Persian glory still lives in the mind of the Iranians. Cyrus the 
Great, his leadership, and the Zoroastrian (Shi‘a) moral code and social justice are still 
viewed as the elements of a just world order. Another example that emphasizes the 
Iranian exceptionalism is the behavior of the new Islamic State toward the Western-
dominated world system. During these thirty years of the Islamic Republic, Iran‘s 
security and foreign policy has been predominantly anti-Western and has endeavored to 
portray Iran as a unique nation even within the Muslim world. The portretization of the 
Islamic Iran as the country whose goal is to unite the Muslim world against the ―evil‖ 
West is not that far from the belief held by Cyrus the Great who considered it a task given 
from the Supreme God to unite people of the earth in one kingdom of justice and peace. 
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Foreign Conquests and Exploitation 
A second bloc of the Iranian history deals with the frequent and systematic 
conquests and exploitations of Iran from other foreign forces throughout the history. The 
first major conquest that Iran has endured was its conquest from the Alexander the Great 
in 332 B.C. The conquest of Persia came after centuries of glory and dominance. In order 
to destroy also the glory of Persia, Alexander the Great obliterated Persepolis, the 
symbol of the Persian identity. The second major conquest of Iran occurred in 651 C.E. 
when the Islamic Arab forces (the Bedouins) invaded the Sassanid dynasty, following 
their goal of spreading the Islamic religion. This occupation, as mentioned earlier, 
divided Iran‘s history in the Pre-Islamic and Islamic history. During the Islamic history, 
Iran went through a new series of conquests and existential threats from foreign powers. 
In addition, the eleventh century brought a series of conquests for Iran. The Seljuk 
Turks were the first to invade Iran in the beginning of the century. Even though Seljuk 
Turks did not cause any destruction to Iran‘s economy, they seriously threatened Iran 
religiously and politically (Mackey 1996, 68).  The worse was about to come. In 1206, a 
highly skilled and mobile army of Mongols invaded Iran and perpetrated an infamous 
spree of killings among the Iranian population. For the first time in its history, Iran was 
facing the extermination of its population and its very existence. To make the situation 
worse, in 1384, the Tatars invaded Iran and drove the Iranian population further to 
extermination. Moreover, in 1514, another threat came from the Ottoman Empire. The 
Ottoman leader Selim I defeated Ismail Shah of Iran at the battle of Chaldiran and 
managed to enter the Iranian capital. Despite the Iranian defeat, due to his army 
overextension and disapproval of the invasion, Selim I was forced to retreat.  
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Even though the Ottoman occupation of 1514 is considered the last serious threat 
to the Iranian heartland, other minor wars followed between Iran and other foreign 
powers, resulting in exploitation and annexation of the Iranian territories. The nineteenth 
century confronted Iran with two great powers: Russia and Great Britain. Throughout this 
period, Great Britain and Russia were the threats and the protectors of Iran, depending on 
the balance of power that the Iranian leaders implemented to avoid domination from one 
party. This period was characterized by wars and stupendous concessions given to both 
the Russians and the British from Iran, such was the Most Favored Nation Clause given 
to British in 1841. These concessions culminated in 1872 when the British Baron Julius 
de Reuter received a concession that granted him the exclusive right to the Iranian 
infrastructure, national banks, mineral extraction, and the exploitation of forests (Ansari 
2006, 14; Milani 1994, 25). This was a move by the Prime Minister Mirza Husain Khan 
to avoid Iran from falling under the Russian dominance (Keddie 2003, 54). A series of 
wars preceded and followed these concessions. 
The first war was what is known as The Russian-Persian War. This war continued 
from 1804 to 1813. One of the main causes for this war was the Iranian desire to regain 
Georgia from Russia. For this reason, Iran (Fath Ali Shah), under the Qajars Dynasty, 
signed the Treaty of Finkenstein in which France would help Iran regain Georgia from 
Russia in exchange for Iran‘s military help against the British. However, this treaty did 
not work because France soon signed a peace treaty with Russia, the Peace of Tilsit 
(Ansari 2006, 10). The first war with Russia ended in 1813 with Iran signing the Treaty 
of Gulistan, which gave to the Russians other important territories in Caucasia and the 
exclusive right to have warships on the Caspian Sea (Keddie 2003, 38).  
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The Treaty of Gulistan was later considered ambiguous by the Iranians and 
claimed that the Russians were occupying territories that were beyond the provisions of 
the treaty. In addition to the ambiguity of the treaty, some clergy members claimed that 
the Russians were persecuting other Muslims in their occupied territories. These claims 
urged Fath Ali Shah, in 1826, to declare the second war against Russia by proclaiming 
jihad. However, the military superiority of Russia decisively defeated the Iranian army. 
Iran was forced to sign the Treaty of Turkomanchai, which annexed more territories from 
Iran. Among other concessions, this treaty forbade Iran from navigating the Caspian Sea. 
In addition, Iran was obligated to sign economic treaties based on the Russian 
preferences. Moreover, the Russians had the right to send their consulate envoys 
everywhere they please in Iran. Finally, Iran was required to pay Russia a certain amount 
of money in retribution.  
In 1856, Iran fought another war, but this time against the British army. This war 
is called the Anglo-Persia War and was a result of the British responding to the Iranian 
quest to occupy the Afghan city of Herat. The British troops managed to force Iran to 
abandon the quest of Herat. As a result, Iran and the Great Britain signed the Peace of 
Paris in 1857, which forced Iran to renounce its claim for Herat. Since then, the presence 
of the British influence in Iran would continue to increase through its cooperation with 
Iran in the oil field, which resulted in creation of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in 
1909.  
However, the conquests would not end here. In August 25, 1941 occurred what is 
known today as the Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran. The reason for this invasion dates back 
in the outbreak of the WWII when Iran and the Nazi Germany had intensive political and 
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economic relations. The Iranian sympathy for the Germans caused great concerns once 
the Nazis invaded the Soviet Union in June of 1941. Reza Shah and the elite of the 
Iranian politics had openly expressed their sympathy for the Nazi Germany and their 
superiority as the Land of the Aryans, which is assumed to be the meaning for Iran. 
(Gonzales 2007, 43). Both the British and the Soviets became concerned about any 
possible German domination or invasion of Iran, which would cut off the supply for 
Soviet troops. To avoid this scenario, the British and the Soviets sent a note to the Iranian 
government demanding the expulsion of the Germans from the Iranian territory (Keddie 
2003, 105). Reza Shah responded negatively to this note, causing both the Great Britain 
and the Soviet Union to invade Iran.  
By invading Iran, Great Britain and Russia ensured control over oil supplies, a 
vital necessity especially during the time of war against the Nazi Germany, and created a 
―land corridor‖ to the Soviet Union. This corridor would be used to supply Soviet troops 
with oil and other goods while being at war with the Germans (Abrahamian 2008, 97). 
By invading Iran, at the same time, the British and the Soviet forces secured the oil fields 
from any possible German invasion. Fearing Reza Shah, the British and the Soviets 
decided to depose Reza Shah and to bring into power the young prince Mohammad Reza 
Shah. In January 1942, Mohammad Reza Shah, the Great Britain, and the Soviet Union 
signed an alliance which obliged the British and Soviets to safeguard the Iranian 
economy from the negative impact of the war and mandated the withdrawal of the troops 
within six months after the end of the war (Keddie 2003, 105). After the war, the foreign 
troops withdrew from Iran, leaving the country in critical economic conditions. The 
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British influence on Iran would come to an end in 1953 after the coup d‟état against the 
Mohamed Mossadeq and the American involvement in the region. 
The 1953 coup d‘état against Mohammad Mossadeq remains one of the most 
important events in the Iranian history. It has played a significant role in shaping the 
future of not only the domestic policies but also of Iran‘s relations with other states. As 
Mark Gasiorowski argues, ―If Mosaddeq had not been overthrown, the revolution might 
not have occurred‖ (Gasiorowski 1987, 261). Mossadeq was a Western-educated 
politician and was known as a firm nationalist. His popularity made him the leader of the 
National Front, which was a coalition of the secular and religious nationalist parties. 
Early in his political career, Mossadeq had identified himself with two main issues: ―a 
desire to transfer political power from the royal court to the parliament (known as the 
Majles), and a desire to increase Iran's control over its oil industry, which was controlled 
by the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company‖ (1987, 262). 
In 1950, Mossadeq and many other members of the National Front were elected 
deputies of the Majles. Together with other representatives of the National Front in 
Majles, Mossadeq took initiatives to reduce the power of the Shah and attempted to 
organize a nationalist movement against Shah‘s policies that had given to the British a 
major portion of the oil industry. For this purpose, Mossadeq submitted a bill to the 
Majles aiming at the nationalization of the oil industry. In March 1951, Majles approved 
the nationalization of the oil industry and managed to appoint Mossadeq as the Prime 
Minister of Iran, against the Shah‘s will. In 1952, Mossadeq resigned his position after 
the Shah‘s negative response to his demand for the control of the armed forces. However, 
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due to the public pressure, the Shah was forced to reinstate Mossadeq as the Prime 
Minister of Iran.  
The nationalization of the oil industry and his connections to the Tudeh party 
brought Mossadeq in conflict with the British and the United States governments, and 
also with the Shah at home. Both governments planned to overthrow Mossadeq. The 
British were angered by the nationalization of the oil industry and the Americans saw an 
opportunity for the American oil companies to benefit from the Iranian oil production. In 
addition, Americans feared the expansion of the Russian communist influence in Iran due 
to the Mossadeq‘s close relation with the communist party—Tudeh Party. For this 
purpose, the United States launched the operation codenamed BEDAMN. This operation 
started in 1948 and aimed at containing the Soviet and the Tudeh influence in Iran and 
weakening the National Front by undermining its mass base of support (1987, 268-69). 
Iran and the United States had previously signed the Mutual Defense Agreement in 1950 
through which U.S. recognized Iran as a strategic country for implementing the Truman 
Doctrine. This goal of this doctrine was to contain communism and to limit or destroy the 
Soviet influence in the region (Milani 1994, 38). 
The British intelligence services and the U.S. Central Intelligence Service (CIA) 
made a detailed plan for deposing Mossadeq. The plan consisted of three main strategies. 
First, there was the using of legal channels to force Mossadeq accept the International 
Court of Justice as the arbiter of the oil disputes. Mossadeq rejected all the proposals. 
The second strategy included the undermining of Mossadeq‘s base of support by 
imposing stringent economic sanctions and black-mailing his government through 
military maneuvering in the region. The third strategy left to be used against Mossadeq 
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was to remove him from the office through covert political actions conducted by anti-
Mossadeq and pro-Western forces in Iran (Gasiorowski 1987, 263). The CIA resumed the 
leading role in this operation after the staff of the British embassy left Iran in November, 
1952. Meanwhile, and as a result of Mossadeq‘s growing popularity and power, the Shah 
was forced to go in exile in 1953.  
The coup organized by the CIA aimed at promoting anti-Mossadeq propaganda 
from the opposition and encouraging high military officers to organize against Mossadeq. 
The operation for this purpose was named the Operation AJAX and was directed by the 
CIA officer Kermit Roosevelt in collaboration with the British M16 (Bergman 2008, 4; 
Gasiorowski 1987, 271). Besides the Shah, there were three main groups within Iran that 
brought down Mossadeq. The first group included a group of military officers led by 
Fazlollah Zahedi. Zahedi was a retired general and member of the Senate who also 
headed the Retired Officers' Association. The second group included members of the 
National Front who wanted Mossadeq deposed. In this group were the Rashidian 
brothers, who were the key players of the anti-Mossadeq movements before the coup. 
The third group included prominent figures of the National Front who worked to 
undermine Mossadeq‘s political base of support. This group included Hussein Makki, and 
Ayatollah Kashani (Gasiorowski 1987, 269). 
The coup succeeded in overthrowing Mossadeq in August 19, 1953. Soon after 
the coup, Mossadeq was arrested and Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi returned home and 
instituted the martial law throughout the country. This was followed by a long series of 
arrests of the supporters of the National Front and of the Tudeh Party. The Press 
censorship was instituted and the pro-Mossadeq demonstrations were crushed by Shah‘s 
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military and militia forces. In addition, the Shah, with the help of the CIA, established the 
most fearful and notorious secret police forces of the modern Iran named SAVAK. 
Together with Mossadeq ended the process that would bring a more representative form 
of government for the people and the Iranian independence from foreign dominance 
(Gasiorowski 1987, 278). In the eyes of the Iranian people, Mossadeq was a martyr who 
reminded the Iranians the Persian empathy for the just ruler and the veneration for Imam 
Ali and Hussein who sacrificed themselves for justice and freedom. Ali Ansari states it in 
his own words: ―Mossadeq is seen as an opportunity lost and an icon to be lamented‖ 
(Ansari 2006, 38). However, the foreign intervention would not end here. In 1980, a 
brutal attack was launched against Iran from its neighbor Iraq. A bloody war started. 
 The Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) can be considered one of the longest and the 
bloodiest wars in the history of the modern Iran. For some scholars, the war was the latest 
manifestation of the Arab-Persian struggle for the domination of the Gulf region. For 
some others, the war was just the extension of the historic struggle for power between the 
Sunni (Iraq) and Shi‘a Islam (Iran). And for many others, the Iran-Iraq War was a 
struggle for power and the domination of the regional politics, following the decline of 
the Iranian hegemony and the Saddam‘s quest to become the new ―policeman of the 
region‖. The war started less than six years after Iran and Iraq had signed what is called 
The 1975 Algiers Agreement. It was an agreement to settle the borders dispute and to stop 
interference in internal affairs of each country. One main dispute involved the issue of the 
oil-rich and multi-ethnic province of Khuzestan, which borders Iraq. Due to the Arab (or 
non-Persian) majority of the province, Iraq claimed the historical right to control it. The 
disputes also involved Iraq‘s claim about several small islands in the Persian Gulf that 
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were occupied by the Iranian military. Moreover, the Shatt al-Arab waterway was 
another territorial dispute between Iraq and Iran. Due to Iraq‘s very limited access to the 
Persian Gulf, the control of the Shatt al-Arab waterway would become an economic and 
strategic gain for Iraq. Parties signed the Algiers Agreement under the promise to 
permanently stop the disputes and to restore good relationship and mutual cooperation. It 
is important to mention that this treaty did not incorporate an escape clause that would 
enable one party to deflect for certain reasons. 
 However, the situation in the region changed rapidly and radically after the 
triumph of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the growing hostility between the new 
Islamic government and the United States, especially after the Islamic conquest of the 
U.S. embassy in Tehran. For Iraq, the revolution could expand its impact in other regions 
of the Persian Gulf and a potential Islamic Shi‘a movement would be a serious threat to 
the Iraqi regime. In addition to his desire to become hegemony, the Iraqi leader, Saddam 
Hussein, considered Iran an easy target due to the vulnerability created internally by the 
revolution. This perception was strengthened by the assumption that by losing the 
American support, Iran had lost the political and military support from the West. Saddam 
decided to take advantage of the new opportunities. On September 22, 1980, Iraq 
launched a massive attack on Iran. In response to the invasion, the Islamic government of 
Iran mobilized the regular army, the Pasdaran, and Basij volunteers, including young 
boys and girls.  
Meanwhile, the Islamic government in Iran was going through radical processes 
of change and consolidation. The war also consolidated the popular support for the 
Supreme Leader and his government. By the 1982, after Bani Sadr was forced out of the 
office and Mujahedin-e Khalq-e Iran organization was almost entirely destroyed, the war 
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began to take a different course. Once in defense, now Iran became an offensive force. 
The 1982 counteroffensive forced Saddam to retreat from the occupied territories. After 
this, the Iranians intensified their war goals by demanding the removal of Saddam from 
power and a huge amount in reparations (Axworthy 2008, 268). The Iranians also 
rejected a peace plan proposed by the Arab League which demanded an immediate cease-
fire, total withdrawal of the Iraqi army, and a $70 billion in reparation for Iran through 
the Islamic Reconstruction Bank (Milani 1994, 209).  
Despite the international indifference toward this conflict, certain foreign powers 
secretly engaged in conflict by providing weaponry assistance to countries at war. 
Throughout the war, the United States provided military assistance to both sides, 
depending on the course of the war. Once the Americans realized that Iran was gaining 
strength, they immediately launched an anti-Iran strategy. This strategy consisted of 
supporting Iraq both directly and indirectly, financially and militarily. In 1982, the U.S. 
State Department removed Saddam from the department‘s list of ―sponsors of terrorism‖, 
and in 1984, diplomatic relations with Baghdad were established. Also, in 1984, the 
Reagan administration launched the Operation Staunch, which aimed at stopping the 
flow of arms to Iran. Iraq soon became the largest importer of weapons in the region. The 
Soviets became the main providers of arms to Iraq. The West Germany also assisted Iraq 
in building chemical and biological weapons, which were used later by Saddam against 
the Kurds and the Iranians. France provided Iraq with aircraft and long-range bombers. 
The Iran-Iraq war became a concern when Iraq began the tanker war. The tanker war 
consisted of attacks on oil-transporting ships in the Persian Gulf. This type of war 
endangered the U.S. interests in the Gulf. The U.S. navy soon became involved in this 
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type of war by supporting the Iraqis and attacking the Iranian navy. This culminated with 
the USS Vincennes downing an Iranian commercial aircraft, killing all its 290 people on 
board. 
Interim, in November 1986, a Lebanese newspaper revealed that the United 
States, through Israel, was providing weapons to Iran. This became known as the Iran-
Contra Affair (analyzed below as a case study). Due to its desperate need for weapons to 
stop Iraq, Iran was willing to buy weapons from everyone, including The Great Satan. 
Many believed that Israel was supporting Iran with weapons since the beginning of the 
war. The rationale behind this action was Israel‘s strategy to prolong the conflict, causing 
severe mutual destruction of both parties in the conflict, and provide military assistance 
to the anti-Khomeini groups in order to overthrow the theocratic regime in Iran. The U.S. 
officials also claimed that this affair was used to provide military support for groups 
within Iran that were willing to overthrow the regime. Major reasons for the U.S. 
involvement in this matter were the release of the American hostages held by Shi‘a rebels 
in Lebanon and the need for monetary support for the Contras in Latin America. Facing 
the international isolation, unable to gather international support to condemn the 
Saddam‘s atrocities and the Vincennes incident, and succumbing to the argument of the 
Majles Speaker, Akbar Ali Hashemi Rafsanjani, that ―the United States would never 
allow Iran to succeed in the war‖, the Supreme leader decided to allow President 
Khamenei announce the acceptance of the UN Resolution 598, which called for a cease-
fire (Axworthy 2008, 269). Both countries accepted the resolution. 
Thus, again, Iran survived and raised above all these existential threats the same 
way and with the same strength as it did previously from the Greek, Arab, British, and 
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Soviet threats. In the words of Sandra Mackey, ―what matters is the Iranian perception 
that they, as people, must always live with the terrible threat of outsiders who have so 
often plundered and debilitated the Iranian nation‖ (1996, 71). 
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Chapter Three 
The Islamic Revolution of 1979 
Major Factors Leading to the Revolution  
The Islamic Revolution of 1979 remains a crucial moment in the history of the 
modern Iran. Unlike what many would claim, the revolution was not a surprise to the 
Iranian people and to those who were familiar with Iran‘s social and political history. The 
revolution was a result of an overwhelming pressure and anger accumulated in decades in 
almost all the fields of the Iranian society—social, economic, and political. Ervand 
Abrahimian summarizes the sources of the pressure and anger against the Mohammad 
Reza Shah Pahlavi as follows: 
―In an age of republicanism, he flaunted monarchism, shahism, and 
Pahlavism. In an age of nationalism and anti-imperialism, he came to 
power as a direct result of the CIA-M16 overthrow of Mossadeq—the idol 
of Iranian nationalism. In an age of neutralism, he mocked non-alignment 
and Third Worldism. Instead he appointed himself America‟s policeman in 
the Persian Gulf, and openly sided with the USA on such sensitive issues 
as Palestine and Vietnam. And in an age of democracy, he waxed eloquent 
on the virtues of order, discipline, guidance, kingship, and his personal 
communication with God.‖ (Abrahamian 2008, 156)  
Besides the 1953 coup d‘état against Mossadeq (analyzed previously), there are 
several events and factors that explain why the revolution and its triumph was not a 
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surprise. The first main event was the Constitutional Movement of 1906. This movement 
was a result of the discontent of the people toward the interference and domination from 
foreign countries like Russia and Great Britain and the need to establish e democratic 
form of government. These two main sources of the discontent became the main 
objectives of the Constitutional Movement, which incorporated merchants, secular 
reformers, and Shi‘a ulama (Milani 1994, 28). On August 5, 1906, Mozaffar ad-Din Shah 
signed the royal proclamation ordering the creation of the Majles and vested its deputies 
with the duty of drafting the Constitution. Soon, the Constitution was drafted and came 
into effect immediately after the Shah signed it on December 30, 1906. One of the most 
controversial articles of the new constitution was the Article 2, which limited the power 
of the people (given through Majles) by creating a committee of five ulama who had the 
power to veto any Majles legislation that was considered being against the Islamic law. 
However, the Constitutional Movement was defeated due to the conflict between the 
secular reformers and ulama and the foreign intervention in Iran‘s internal affairs. 
Despite the defeat, the Constitutional Movement succeeded in legitimizing elections, 
reducing the power of the Shah and its perceptiveness, and granting to the people rights 
and powers they had not had before (1994, 31). 
Another main event that produced more anger and pressure toward the Shah‘s 
regime was what is known as the White Revolution, or The Revolution of the Shah and 
the People. The White Revolution incorporated (1) land reform, (2) sale of the state-
owned factories to the public, (3) women‘s suffrage, (4) nationalization of forests, (5) 
creation of a national literacy corps, and (6) the workers‘ profit-sharing plan (Keddie 
2003, 145; Milani 1994, 46). These reforms ignited anger among two main social groups, 
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the landlords and the ulama. The land reform severely limited the political power of the 
landed upper class and provided the government with absolute authority. Due to this 
reform, many peasants became landless and migrated to large cities, where they became a 
main source for the army of the Islamic Revolution (Milani 1994, 47). The land reform 
also promoted opposition from ulama because of the fact that the reform dealt also with 
vaqf holdings (land for charitable purposes), resulting in drastically reducing the revenue 
of the ulama. 
In opposition to Shah‘s White Revolution, ulama organized what is known as the 
June Uprising of the 1963. Among other ulama were Grand Ayatollahs Rohullah 
Khomeini, Shariatmadari, Golpayegani, Ayatollah Najafi Mar‘ashi, and Hojatoislam 
Hussein Ali Montazeri. The land reform, women‘s suffrage and the de facto recognition 
of the state of Israel served as causes for ulama to unite against the Shah. This was the 
opportune moment for Khomeini to emerge as a religious and political leader. Khomeini 
became the most aggressive and popular opponent of the Shah. In early 1963, Khomeini 
began to preach against the Shah in Faiziyeh, a madrasa of Qom. In March of the same 
year, the madrasa was attacked by militia and the SAVAK forces, killing a number of 
students and arresting Khomeini (Keddie, 2003, p. 147). Immediately after his release, 
Khomeini continued his attack on the Shah and his pro-American policy. He was arrested 
again on the anniversary of the martyrdom of Imam Hussein, after delivering a speech 
comparing the Shah to Yazid I, the caliph who had martyred Imam Hussein at the Battle 
of Karbala (Gonzales 2007, 55). This governmental action promoted abrupt and fierce 
demonstrations in the major cities of Iran, demanding for Khomeini‘s release and 
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declaring Holy War against the Shah. Soon, the June Uprising was suppressed and 
Khomeini was sent to exile. 
However, the vivid memories of the Constitutional Movement, the 1953 coup 
d‘état against Mossadeq, and the June Uprising would not have a definitive impact on 
overthrowing the Shah without the existence of what Samuel P. Huntington (1968) 
considers the gap theory, similar to what Ted Robert Gurr considers relative deprivation 
(1970). Huntington argues that modernization is a multifaceted process involving a 
fundamental shift in values, attitudes, and expectations (Huntington 1968, 32).  
Huntington defines the impact of modernization as follow: 
 ―At the intellectual level, modernization involves the tremendous 
expansion of man‟s knowledge about his environment and the diffusion of his 
knowledge throughout society through increased literacy, mass 
communication, and education. Demographically, modernization means 
changes in the pattern of life…Socially, modernization tends to supplement 
the family and other primary groups having diffuse roles with consciously 
organized secondary association having much more specific 
functions…Economically, there is a diversification of activity as a few simple 
occupations give way to many complex ones…‖ (1968, 32-33) 
According to Huntington, social mobilization and the economic development are 
the main aspects of modernization related to politics. Social mobilization increases the 
aspiration and expectations. The economic development increases the capacity of a 
society to satisfy those aspirations and expectations. However, a gap develops between 
the aspirations and expectations and the capacity to fulfill those aspirations and 
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expectations. This situation generates social frustration, dissatisfaction, and political 
instability (1968, 54). Iran was under the same conditions. 
Under the leadership of the Shah and his reforms for modernization, Iran 
witnessed a rapid economic development. During his last two decades of reign, the Shah 
was interested in modernizing Iran‘s economy and society and giving Iran a Western 
character and a modernized military (Keddie 2003, 133). This was made possible also by 
the high oil revenue entering in government‘s budget. In addition, this modernization 
process promoted by the Shah resulted in a high rate of social mobilization of the Iranian 
people. Dr. Mohsen M. Milani uses the gap theory to explain how the rapid 
socioeconomic development and the lack of an institutional building process created the 
gap that would set the stage for the Revolution to start. For Milani, the socioeconomic 
development increases social mobilization and the demand for political participation by 
various groups. And as he indicates, ―To deny participation to those who desire to 
become involved in politics is to create the fertile ground from which a revolution 
grows.‖ (1994, 15).  
Nevertheless, this alone cannot be sufficient to start the revolution without the 
presence of what Milani calls the perception by the people of the ―support linkage‖ 
between Iran and the United States and the indecisiveness of the Shah to act (1994, 16). 
The American support, the rapid economic expansion, and the repression were three main 
factors that helped the Shah retain power. There existed a perception from the Iranian 
people that the American support for Shah‘s regime had weakened. The human rights 
policy promoted by the Carter administration and Shah‘s liberalization reform of 1977 
severely aggravated Shah‘s political situation. Being denounced by the United Nations 
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and the Amnesty International for severe violation of the human rights, the American 
human rights policy was perceived by the Iranian people as a pressure toward Shah to 
reform the political system. This situation was exacerbated by the inconsistent American 
policy toward Iran, which was a result of the radical split within the Carter 
administration. In the eyes of the Iranian people, the U.S. weakening support for the Shah 
was tantamount to losing the source of power to survive. To make the matter worse, 
Shah‘s liberalization reform allowed political and social groups to organize their anti-
Shah movement. In addition, the Shah was known for his indecisiveness and the ability to 
use violence ―at the right time‖ and direct it toward ―the right group‖ (1994, 128). To all 
these can be added the fact that the Shah was suffering from an incurable disease, which 
might have influenced his decision-making ability. Marxist, nationalist, and other social 
groups took advantage of this situation by implementing their own agendas and 
strategies. 
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Main Political and Social Groups 
This situation led many social and political groups to organize and challenge the 
regime. One main political group included the Marxist organizations such as the Tudeh 
Party and the Fada‟iyun-e Khalq. The Tudeh Party became an influential political actor 
after the triumph of Bolshevism in Russia in 1917. However, its force and reputation 
started to fade after the alleged conspiracies that this party planned against Mossadeq 
during the 1953 coup d‘état. The Fada‟iyun-e Khalq also did not have any better history 
than the Tudeh Party. They both ended up losing their leaders and supporters in 
confronting the Shah. Another important political group included the National Front. 
National Front was a very popular secular nationalist organization. However, after the 
1953 coup d‘état and the imprisonment of its historic leader Mahmud Mossadeq, the 
organization was severely damaged by conflicts between its members and the systematic 
persecution and executions of its members conducted by the SAVAK forces. Shah 
considered the National Front as the primary threat to his regime. 
In addition to the political organizations, the anti-Shah movement included 
several social groups. One main social group was what was called the Cultural 
Revivalism group, comprising prominent intellectuals whose work aimed at portraying 
Shah‘s regime as unjust and illegitimate. This group of scholars included Seyyed 
Fakhreddin Shadman Valavi, Samad Behrangi, Mehdi Bazargan, Al-e Ahmad, and Ali 
Shari‘ati. Shadman was a Huntington of his time because he emphasized the threat that 
the Western civilization posed to the existence of the Iranian culture and identity.  
Behrangi was considered a ―secular leftist‖ who mocked the like-Western behavior of the 
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Iranian bourgeoisie and condemned the American influence in the Iranian education 
system (Hanson 1983, 1). 
Al-e Ahmad was also an anti-Western, but his views were focused more on the 
West as an imperialist power, an indication of his past membership in the Tudeh Party. In 
addition, Bazargan focused himself on the internal conditions of Iran as the main causes 
of despotism and proposed the creation of an Islamic government run by experts who 
were also devoted Shi‘as (Milani 1994, 80). Like Bazargan, Shari‘ati was concerned 
about the intrusion of the Western values and ideas in the Iranian culture and the threat 
that it represented to Shi‘a religion in Iran. He argued that ulama had failed to spread the 
ideas and teachings of the true Shi‘ism, which he called Alavi Shi‟ism. As a staunch 
opponent of the regime, Shari‘iati was banned from lecturing and put under SAVAK 
surveillance. He died in London in 1977, without having the opportunity to witness the 
revolution he had lectured about.  
Moreover, the Mojahedin-e Khalq-e Iran was another major component of the 
Islamic Revolution of 1979. The organization was founded in 1965 and is considered by 
some scholars as ―the first Iranian organization to develop systematically a modern 
revolutionary interpretation of Islam‖ (as cited in Boroujerdi 1996, 116). The 
organization emphasized and supported ideas expressed from Bazargan and Ali Shari‘ati 
with regard to the Western threat to Iran and Islam. The majority of its members and 
supporters came from the traditional and bazaar classes. The major source of support and 
recruitments was also concentrated in universities. The ideology of Mojahedin-e Khalq-e 
Iran was based on two major characteristics of the Iranian thoughts at that time: 
nationalism and populism. As such, they considered themselves ―inheritors‖ of the 
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legacies of the constitutional movement of the early 1900s, of the movement of Mirza 
Kucheck-Khan, and of the nationalist movement of the 1950 led by Mahmud Mossadeq 
(1996, 117). The Mojahedins proclaimed Islam to be the sole ideology capable of 
mobilizing all the parts of the Iranian society in confronting the Western dominance. 
Inspired by the victory of Fidel Castro in Cuba, the Mojahedins believed in the need for 
armed struggle against the current regime as the most efficient strategy. They emphasized 
the concepts of resistance, martyrdom, revolution, and a classless society (Boroujerdi 
1996, 117). However, in 1975 and on, many members of the Mujahedin organization 
were converted to Marxism. From the middle of 1975 to 1979, the organization was 
divided in two major and antagonistic groups—Islamic and Marxist. As a result, the 
Mojahedins not only lost their power in confronting Shah‘s regime, but they also lost the 
public support. 
 Finally, Shi‘a ulama are considered lawyers who interpret and expand on religious 
law. They subscribe their role to the spiritual, social, and the political needs of their 
community. Shi‘a ulama are educated at seminaries of Najaf in Iraq and Qom in Iran. In 
seminaries, students are prepared to reach a high level of proficiency in law, 
jurisprudence, theology, philosophy, logic, rhetoric, and literature. At the top of the Shi‘a 
hierarchy are the most senior clergy, who are called sources of emulation (marja‟al-
taqlid). Every Shi‘a follows one marja‟. The rank of a Shi‘a cleric is determined by the 
profile of his mentor, the role of the mentor in student‘s formation, the quality of his 
publications, and the amount of the religious taxes and donations that the believer gives 
to the mentor for charitable purposes (Nasr, 2007, pp. 70-71). Besides Grand Ayatollah 
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Muhammad Husain Boroujerdi, many argue, there has never been any universally 
accepted supreme ayatollah or source of emulation. 
Among the most influential ulama that worked for the Islamic Revolution were 
Grand Ayatollahs Rohullah Khomeini, Shariatmadari, Ayatollahs Mahmud Taleqani, 
Najafi Mar‘ashi, and Hojatoislam Hussein Ali Montazeri. The revolution brought to an 
end the Safavid Contract, which stated that ―Shi‘a ulama would not recognize the Safavid 
monarchy as truly legitimate but would bless it as the most desirable form of government 
during the period of waiting.‖ (2007, 74). The Safavid Contract was replaced by the 
Khomeini‘s doctrine of velayat-e faqih, which rendered Shi‘ism and Islam incompatible 
with monarchy and advocated the direct ruling by ulama. 
Despite the controversies among high-ranking clergy, ulama managed to succeed 
over other coalition forces of the revolution. There are several reasons why ulama 
succeeded. First, Shi‘ism became the leading ideology of the revolution and justified the 
struggle against the Shah. Ulama were the source of this ideology that appealed 
legitimacy. Second, unlike other groups, ulama had significant financial resources 
coming from donations and charities. Third, due to their nature and activity, ulama were 
able to organize masses through Mosques. Because of the very organized nature of 
Shi‘ism, ulama managed to create a nation-wide organization of the masses. Fourth, 
ulama had a very charismatic and skillful leader like Ayatollah Khomeini. Fifth, 
Khomeini‘s supporters were trustful and adamant. Sixth, ulama were supported by lower 
classes people who had nothing to lose. Lastly, Khomeini was skillful and able enough to 
build parallel institutions to those of the old institutions—building ―a state within the 
state‖. While Khomeini kept the old institutions, he also built parallel institutions like the 
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Islamic Republican Party (parliament), the Revolutionary Guard (national army), the 
Komites (local police), the Revolutionary Courts (judiciary), etc. 
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Chapter Four 
Ayatollah Rohulla Khomeini and the Velayat-e Faqif Doctrine 
Khomeini‟s Life 
Ayatollah Rohulla Khomeini was born in September 24
th
, 1902 in a family of 
seyyed (descendants of the Prophet). The title Ayatollah (the Sign of God) was given to 
Khomeini based on his education credentials as prescribed under the Shi‘a Islamic 
tradition. Many believe that the life of Ayatollah Khomeini has gone through three 
different phases. The first phase, from 1908 to 1962, was characterized by training, 
teaching, and writing in the field of Islamic studies. At the age of six he began to study 
the Koran and elementary Persian. Later, he completed his studies in Islamic law, ethics, 
and spiritual philosophy under the supervision of Ayatollah Abdul Karim Haeri-ye Yazdi 
in Qom. During this scholarly phase of his life, Khomeini did not participate in political 
activities. However, his studies, teachings, and writings indicate that he firmly believed 
that leadership of political activities should be in the hands of the most prominent 
members of the Shi‘a ulama. 
The second phase of Khomeini's life, from 1962 to 1979, was characterized by 
highly political activism, which was influenced by his strict, religious interpretation of 
Shi‘a Islam. He started his struggle against the Shah's regime in 1962, which led to the 
outbreak of a religious and political rebellion on June 5, 1963. This date can be regarded 
as a turning point in the history of the Islamic movement in Iran and as a pivotal moment 
that crystallized the religious and political profile of Khomeini. As analyzed previously, 
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Khomeini became the most aggressive and popular opponent of the Shah. In early 1963, 
Khomeini began to preach against the Shah in Faiziyeh, a madrasa of Qom. In March of 
the same year, the madrasa was attacked by militia and the SAVAK forces, killing a 
number of students and arresting Khomeini (Keddie 2003, 147). Immediately after his 
release, Khomeini continued his attack on the Shah and his pro-American policy. He was 
arrested again on the anniversary of the martyrdom of Imam Hussein, after delivering a 
speech comparing the Shah to Yazid, the caliph who had martyred Imam Hussein at the 
Battle of Karbala (Gonzales 2007, 55). This governmental action promoted abrupt and 
fierce demonstrations in the major cities of Iran, demanding for Khomeini‘s release and 
declaring Holy War against the Shah. The Shah brutally crushed the uprising and exiled 
Khomeini in 1964. Khomeini first resided in Iraq and then he moved to France where he 
stood until the outbreak of the Islamic Revolution. However, regardless of the failure of 
the uprising, it was during this time that Khomeini received the title of Marja-e Talqid, 
giving him a very distinguished position among clergy and superior credentials in Iran‘s 
political life. 
The third phase of Khomeini's life begins with his return from exile on February 
1
st
, 1979, just two weeks after Muhammad Reza Shah had been forced out of Iran. On 
February 11
th
, revolutionary forces loyal to Khomeini seized power in Iran, and 
Khomeini emerged as the founder and the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran. Khomeini succeeded in building a new theocratic state of Iran as he envisioned in 
his doctrine of velayat-e faqih. 
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Velayat-e Faqih Doctrine 
 The velayat-e faqih doctrine is the essence of Khomeini‘s vision about the Islamic 
government and the framework that would set the stage for Khomeini to attain the 
leadership of the Islamic Republic. This doctrine has its roots in Shi'a Islam notion of the 
guardianship of jurisprudence—vehemently espoused by Khomeini and opposed by 
some—which gives the faqih (the jurist) the power to decide on state and religious 
matters (Enayat 1983, 170). Khomeini envisioned a modern government that would 
resemble the theocratic Muslim community of the early years of Islam in which ulama 
possessed the legitimate power over the people, given to them directly by the Prophet 
Mohammad through the Imams. Khomeini also based his doctrine on the Kur'anic 
principle that Imams have the divine power to explain the Islamic laws and rules and 
provide them to the people in a simplistic and understandable manner. Khomeini's 
doctrine assumed its legitimacy on his explanation of Kur'anic saying: "O you believers, 
obey God, obey the prophet and obey those in charge among you." (Shevlin 2000, 365).  
In his book Islamic Government: Governance of the Jurist, translated by Hamid 
Algar, Khomeini emphasizes the need for an Islamic government and laid down its main 
principles. Khomeini believes that it is the duty of all true Muslims not only to pray but 
also to act to defend Islam from the internal corruption and the external threats. This is to 
follow the path of the Prophet Muhammad who led Muslims both religiously and 
politically. Khomeini presents five main reasons for creating an Islamic government: 
1. To support the rights of the weak from the oppressing ruling class; 
2. To avoid corruption and the rule by minority; 
3. To preserve the Islamic order and make individuals pursue the Islamic path; 
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4. To prevent the approval of anti-Islamic laws by sham parliaments; and 
5. To destroy the influence and the domination of the foreign powers in Islamic 
lands. (Khomeini n.d., 27-28) 
Khomeini argued that it is self-evident that the Muslim community needed 
―righteous and proper organs of government‖. The Islamic government that he envisioned 
comprises three main branches: legislative, executive, and administrative. Even though 
Khomeini did not mention the judicial branch, he pays special attention to the 
adjudication process for civil and penal matters and considers the faqih both a judge and 
an executor. Khomeini argues that the legislative power and the competence to formulate 
laws belong exclusively to God. He believes that law alone rules over society and that the 
government should be a government of the law. The law should be considered as ―a tool 
or an instrument for the establishment of justice in society, a mean for man‘s intellectual 
and moral reform and his purification‖ (n.d., 47). 
 However, the controversy begins with Khomeini‘s claim about the ruler and his 
religious credentials. Seeing that the government would be a government of law, 
Khomeini claims that the ruler should be a faqih—an expert in Islamic jurisprudence. He 
also argues that being a faqih should be e requirement for all those who hold 
governmental positions. The faqih must surpass other fuqaha (plural for faqih) in 
knowledge. Khomeini summarizes the credentials of the faqih in three main points: (1) to 
be an expert in Islamic jurisprudence, (2) to have the sense of leadership, and (3) to be a 
just ruler (n.d., p. 49). Moreover, as mentioned above, Khomeini believes that the ruling 
by a faqih and the obedience to those entrusted with authority is justified in Ku‘ran‘s 
verses: ―…And obey the holders of authority from among you‖ (as cited in Khomeini 
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n.d., 30). 
Khomeini also argues that fuqaha are the ―heirs of the prophets‖ and fight in 
―God‘s way to implement laws of Islam and establish its social system‖ (n.d., 94). By 
following this explanation, Khomeini claims that there is no difference between the faqih, 
the Most Noble Messenger (Prophet Muhammad), and the Commander of the Faithful 
(Imam Ali) because the ruler has the duty to implement the laws of God. However, the 
faqih does not have absolute authority over other fuqaha and cannot appoint or dismiss 
them. Despite the opposition from the majority of prestigious Shi‟a ulama, Khomeini 
established his doctrine of velayat-e faqih and assumed the role of the faqih soon after the 
triumph of the Islamic Revolution and the adaptation of the Islamic Constitution after the 
referendum of December 2
nd
 and 3
rd
, 1979. 
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Chapter Five 
The Islamic Constitution and Iran‘s Power Structure 
The Islamic Constitution  
Having proclaimed and established Shi'ism as the ideology of the revolution and 
succeeded in overthrowing the Shah, Khomeini moved on to realize his dream of creating 
the Islamic State of Iran based on his doctrine of velayat-e faqih. After debates with other 
coalition members (especially with the provisional Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan) 
about the name of the new state, in the referendum of March 30
th
 and 31
st
 of 1980, 
Iranians voted overwhelmingly to build an Islamic Republic (Taylor & Francis Group and 
Dean 2004, 368). The Islamic Republic was the only form of government to appear on 
the ballot, and votes were not cast in secret. An overwhelming majority of over 98 
percent voted in favor of an Islamic Republic. Khomeini proclaimed the establishment of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran on May 1, 1979, when he ―declared the first day of the 
Government of Allah on the earth‖ (Milani 1994, 154). 
The name given to the new Islamic Republic comprises two meaningful concepts—
(1) Islamic and (2) Republic. However, some argue that both these concepts are 
incongruous to each other, at least from the religious perspective. Abdelwahab Hechiche 
cites Professor Tibi when he states that:  
―the term 'Islamic Republic' betrays the character of contemporary Islam: It is 
a defensive culture. A 'Republic' is a European form of government and is 
identical neither to the Sunni Islamic Caliphate nor to Shi'i Islamic Immamate. 
44 
 
This concept cannot be found in the dogmatic Islamic sources.‖ (as cited in 
Hechiche 2002, 192) 
 In addition, Askari defines some major problems the notion of the Islamic State. 
He argues that there are three main issues when dealing with the notion of the Islamic 
State: 
1. In a theocratic state, sovereignty lies with God. 
2. Sharia is a criterion for an Islamic State. 
3. The problematic issue concerning the very concept of state. 
 Askari argues that ―sovereignty is a concept which has its proper place in 
particular discourse—political science (as cited in Hechiche 2002, 184). He also claims 
that sovereignty cannot be used in the political sense for three main reasons: 
1. It limits God and reduces His transcendence. 
2. It is a violation of the scriptural usage for reasons both earthly and heavenly—
nothing is outside God's dominance and power. 
3. God cannot be identified with one particular social and historical institution. This 
can reduce Him to a deity. (2002, 184) 
Despite this issue, the most important task after the victory of the revolution was 
the drafting of the new constitution that would solidify the structure of the Islamic State. 
Through the new constitution, Khomeini aimed at institutionalizing his doctrine of 
velayat-e faqih. For this purpose, in August of the same year, Iran held election to elect 
73 member of the Majles-e Khebregan (Assembly of Experts), whose primary task was 
drafting the constitution. Khomeini‘s supporters achieved a landslide victory. The 
drafting of the constitution created two main opposing groups. On one hand, there were 
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Bazargan and his supporters who supported a constitution modeled after the Charles de 
Gaulle‟s Fifth Republic and envisioned ―a republic that would be Islamic in name but 
more democratic in content‖ (Abrahamian 2008, 162). The draft proposed by Bazargan 
was similar to the 1906 Constitution and provided ulama with a little power in state 
matters. On the other hand, there were Khomeini and his disciples who envisioned a 
constitution based on the velayat-e faqih doctrine, with ulama dominating and having 
ultimate decision-making power over the state matters.  
The conflict between these two main opposing groups was also an indication of 
the existence of a dual government. One government was led by Bazargan and comprised 
the old political institutions, and the other government was led by Khomeini and 
comprised a set of parallel institutions created by him, which include the Revolutionary 
Council and the Central Komiteh to oversee the performance of the provisional 
government, the Islamic Republican Party (parliament), the Revolutionary Guard 
(national army), the Komites (local police), and the Revolutionary Courts (judiciary). The 
result of this situation was a constitutional draft ―hybrid—albeit weighted heavily in 
favor of one—between Khomeini‘s velayat-e faqih and Bazargan‘s French Republic; 
between divine rights and the rights of man; between theocracy and democracy; between 
vox dei and vox populi; and between clerical authority and popular sovereignty‖ (2008, 
163-164). The Assembly of Experts for Constitution finished the draft on November 15, 
and the Islamic Constitution was adopted through a national referendum on December 2
nd
 
and 3
rd
, 1979. 
The Constitution was amended in 1989 to cope with the new reality facing the 
Iranian politics—―the transition from the consolidation phase to the reconstruction phase 
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of the Islamic Revolution and the emergence of state as the central player on the Iranian 
political scene‖ (Milani 1994, 225). The election of Khomeini's successor and the 
demand for a stronger and effective executive branch of the government urged the 
Assembly for Reconsideration of Constitution (ad hoc Assembly formed by Khomeini to 
review the Constitution), under Khomeini's previous directives, to remove marjaeyat 
clause and to centralize the executive. The removal of the marjaeyat clause made it 
possible for Khomeini's successor to assume the position of the Supreme Leader based on  
a new (lower) set of religious requirements (1994, 221-222). The centralization of the 
executive branch consisted on the constitutional removal of the office of the prime 
minister and transferring of all its powers to the office of the President (analyzed below). 
However, this change did not have any significant impact on Iran‘s power structure. 
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Iran‟s Power Structure 
The political system of the Islamic Iran has a fairly complicated power structure.  
Kazem Alamdari (2005, 1299) claims:  
“the political structure of the IRI is not constructed like a canopy, in which 
removing the central pole causes its collapse; rather, it is built on many 
independent, rival, parallel columns of power that hold the system together. In 
the case of a sudden collapse of the IRI, a civil war and partition of the Iranian 
territory is highly probable”.  
The political system is comprised of the formal power structure and the informal power 
structure. The formal power structure is clearly defined under the Islamic Constitution 
and is encountered in the structure of state institutions and offices. The formal power 
structure encompasses the Supreme Leader, the Assembly of Experts for Leadership, the 
President, the Council of Ministers, the Expediency Council, the Majles, the Council of 
Guardians, the judiciary, state radio and television, and the armed forces.  
The informal power structure consists of religious-political organizations, 
revolutionary foundations, and paramilitary organizations supporting factions of Iran‘s 
clerical leadership (Buchta 2000, xi). According to Wilfried Buchta (2000, xii)., the 
informal structure consists of ―four concentric rings‖ The first ring, the inner, comprises 
the most powerful clerics in the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the 
government. The second ring comprises ―the most senior nonclerical governmental 
functionaries and administrators‖. The third ring consists of the power base of the regime, 
the members of the revolutionary organizations, the pasdaran and Basij militia, 
revolutionary committees, religious security forces, and media. The forth ring 
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encompasses former influential individuals and groups that serve as interlocutor between 
the civil society and the regime and seek to promote peaceful reforms from within the 
system. 
The Supreme Leader, the President, the Assembly of Experts for Leadership, the 
Majles, the Council of Guardians, and the Expediency Council are the most important 
institutions of the Islamic Republic of Iran. An analysis of these major institutions will 
help us determine how the power is distributed and where the real power rests. However, 
this does not mean that other state (i.e. armed forces and media) and non-state institutions 
(i.e. Teachers of Qom Theological Colleges) are not important. This is to reveal which 
institution(s) bears the dominant power to influence the political decision-making 
process, both domestically and internationally. 
The Supreme Leader is the most influential institution and exerts his power over 
almost every political and social institution. No major decision can be made and no 
policy can be implemented without the approval of the Supreme Leader (Sadjadpour 
2008). The Chapter VIII of the Islamic constitution deals with qualification and powers 
of the Supreme Leader. Qualifications of the Supreme Leader are elaborated in 
Khomeini‘s doctrine of velayat-e faqih, as analyzed previously. The Article 110 provides 
the Supreme Leader with the authority and the rights to exert power as follow: 
1. Delineation of the general policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran after 
consultation with the Nation's Exigency Council. 
2. Supervision over the proper execution of the general policies of the system. 
3. Issuing decrees for national referenda. 
4. Assuming supreme command of the Armed Forces 
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5. Declaration of war and peace and the mobilization of the Armed Forces 
6. Appointment, dismissal, and resignation of: 
a. the religious men on the Guardian Council, 
b. the supreme judicial authority of the country, 
c. the head of the radio and television network of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
d. the chief of the joint staff, 
e. the chief commander of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, and 
f. the supreme commanders of the Armed Forces. 
7. Resolving differences between the three wings of the Armed Forces and 
regulation of their relations. 
8. Resolving the problems which cannot be solved by conventional methods, 
through the Nation's Exigency Council. 
9. Signing the decree formalizing the election of the President of the Republic by 
the people.  The suitability of candidates for the Presidency of the Republic, 
with respect to the qualifications specified in the Constitution, must be 
confirmed before elections take place by the Guardian Council, and, in the 
case of the first term of a President, by the Leadership. 
10. Dismissal of the President of the Republic, with due regard for the interests of 
the country, after the Supreme Court holds him guilty of the violation of his 
constitutional duties, or after a vote of the Islamic Consultative Assembly 
testifying to his incompetence on the basis of the Article 89. 
11. Pardoning or reducing the sentences of convicts, within the framework of 
Islamic criteria, on a recommendation from the Head of judicial power. 
50 
 
In addition, the Leader exerts his power through the Office of the Supreme Leader. 
The main task of this office is to organize and manage the Leader‘s agenda and to keep 
him informed with all the internal and external political development. This office consists 
of four permanent members, all of whom are high-ranking clerics and the most trustful 
collaborators of the Leader. Moreover, the Leader exercises direct power over the other 
institutions through the nemayandeha-ye rahbar (representatives of the supreme leader). 
The representatives are closely connected to the Office of the Supreme Leader and are 
appointed in person by the Leader. Almost all of them are clerics, and the majority of 
them holds the rank of hojjatoeslam (proof of Islam). The representatives make it 
possible for the Leader to exercise his power in five major areas of the Iranian politics, as 
cited by Wilfried Buchta (2000, 48): 
1. Ministries in the executive branch; 
2. The armed forces and security services; 
3. Provincial representatives (Friday imams); 
4. Revolutionary and religious organizations; and 
5. Iranian cultural centers in foreign countries 
The Assembly of Experts for Leadership is the only institution that has the power 
to elect the Faqih and dismiss him when the later is deemed incapable of fulfilling its 
constitutional duties. Its powers are defined under the Article 107 and are exercised in 
accordance with the Article 111. It has the power to appoint and supervise Faqih's 
performance, to make sure that the performance complies with the Islamic ideology, and 
that Faqih is capable to perform his duties. Under the Article 108, the Faqih and religious 
members have the power to appoint the members of the Assembly. Their power is given 
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under the Charter VIII, the Articles 107-111 of the Iranian Islamic constitution. The 
Assembly consists of eighty-six clerics elected by the popular vote to eight-year terms. 
Any candidate for election to the assembly should pass the criteria established by the 
Assembly of Experts and must take the approval of the Council of Guardians. If the 
assembly dismisses the Faqih, than a leadership council composed of the President, the 
head of the judiciary, and a faqih from the Council of Guardians assume the duties of the 
Leader (2000, 60). 
In addition to Iran‘s formal power structure, the President is considered the 
second highest leader of the Islamic Republic. Together with the legislative and the 
executive branches of the government, the President constitutes the democratic element 
of the Islamic Constitution. The Article 56 provides the men with the divine right to 
govern themselves. The Article 57 articulates the separation of powers in three branches 
of the government—executive, legislative, and judicial—all of which functioning under 
the supervision of ―the absolute religious Leader and the Leadership of the Umma‖. 
In addition, the powers and responsibilities of the office of the President are 
enumerated under the Chapter IX, Section 1 and 2, the Articles 113-142. The Article 113 
states that after the office of Leadership (the Leader), the President is the highest official 
of the state. The President has the responsibility for implementing the constitution and 
acting as the head of the executive, except in matters directly concerned with the office of 
the Leader. The President is elected for a four-year term by the direct vote of the people 
and is allowed to serve no more than two terms in office. The President can be removed 
by two-thirds of majority vote of no-confidence in the Parliament. The Majles declare the 
President incompetent and inform the Supreme Leader to dismiss the President in 
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accordance with the Article 110 of the Constitution. His main rights and powers include 
(2000, 23): 
1. To select the first of the four vice presidents; 
2. To appoint and dismiss ministers, who should be confirmed by the 
Majles (Parliament); 
3. To control  the sazeman-e barname va bujet (Planning and Budget 
Organization); 
4. To act as the chairman of the shura-ye amniyat-e melli (National 
Security Council); and  
5. To manage the personnel composition of the shura-ye „ali-yeenqelab-e 
farshangi-ye eslami (Supreme Council of the Islamic Cultural 
Revolution).  
Despite the prestige, the office of the President does not have influence over the 
foreign policy agenda. Even though it is elected by the people, the President should be 
confirmed by the Supreme Leader in order to serve in office. In addition, the President 
and the entire executive branch of the government are subordinated to the velayat-e faqih 
institution. Lastly, and the most important, the President does not have any control over 
the armed and security forces. Only the Faqih has authority over all other institutions and 
in all the political issues (2000, 23). 
Moreover, the Parliament (Majles) represents the legislative body of the Iranian 
government, as defined under the Article 58. The parliament bears significant principal 
similarities with the parliament coming out of the constitutional movement of 1906. 
Members of the parliament are elected every four years through public elections. The 
main rights and powers of the Majles include: ―drafting legislation (the Articles 71-75), 
ratifying international treaties (the Article 77), approving state-of-emergency declarations 
(the Article 79) and loans (the Article 80), examining and approving the annual state 
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budget (the Article 52), and, if necessary, removing from the office the state the president 
and his appointed ministers‖ (2000, 58). Unlike the Western parliaments, the Majles is 
heavily influenced by the clergy rule and domination. The Council of Guardians have 
considerable influence over the Majles composition and legislation. 
Furthermore, the power structure of Iran encompasses the Council of Guardians. 
The Council consists of twelve members and its power is defined under the Article 91 of 
the Constitution. The Council has the right and the power to determine whether or not 
candidates for in the Executive and Legislative branches of the government are suitable 
and competent for their positions. It also determines the compatibility of the legislation 
passed by the Majles with Shi‘a Islam. Six members of the council are religious men 
selected by the Faqih and other six members are jurists specialized in different areas of 
law, who are elected by the Majles from among the Muslim jurists nominated by the head 
of the judiciary. 
Finally, the Expediency Council is another important element of Iran‘s power 
structure. It was created (by Ayatollah Khomeini and being led currently by Ali Akbar 
Hashemi Rafsanjani) to solve cases when there is an impasse within the Council of 
Guardians or between the Majles and the Council of Guardians. Its decision is final and 
irreversible. The Council receives importance in case of impasse between the Council of 
Guardians and the Majles, as was the case in 1988-89. The Council also advises the 
Faqih in accordance with the Articles 110 and 112 of the Constitution. Many believe that 
the current Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, exercises his authority without consulting 
with the Council. 
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Chapter Six 
The Theoretical Approach 
Offensive Realism 
 In order for us to maximize our understanding about Iran's security and foreign 
policy, we need to rely on a theoretical approach that provides an accurate explanation of 
the political phenomena. It is also important to make an analysis of the other theoretical 
approaches in order to be able to realize the main differences between theories of 
international relations as pertaining to this study. While a theory may provide a better 
explanation of the topic compare to the other theories, knowledge about the other theories 
may help us discern hidden aspects and perspectives of the issue or phenomena.  
 As previously stated, the argument of this study is that Iran's security and foreign 
policy is mainly based on the principles of the Offensive Realism theory of international 
relations, founded and advocated by John Mearsheimer (2001). However, it needs to be 
emphasized that this study does not claim or pretend that Offensive Realism explains 
everything regarding Iran‘s security and foreign policy. Indeed, the founder of this theory 
considers it ―a powerful flashlight in a dark room: even though it cannot illuminate every 
nook and cranny, most of the time it is an excellent tool for navigating through the 
darkness‖ (2001, 11). 
 Mearsheimer provides us with five ―bedrock assumptions‖, or principles, of the 
offensive realism (2001, 30-31). The first principle of the Offensive Realism is that the 
international system has an anarchic status. However, it does not mean that the system is 
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chaotic or engulfed by conflicts and wars. The concept of anarchy refers to the notion of 
ordering principle of the international system, which considers the states to be sovereign 
and obeying to no higher authority. Thus, the state of anarchy means that the international 
system lacks a central authority or a supranational government. As Kenneth Waltz 
affirms, conflicts and wars happen in an anarchic international system ―because there is 
nothing to prevent them‖ (2001, 232).   
 The second assumption is that great powers possess some offensive military 
capabilities that can be used to cause damages or even destroy each other. Based on his 
study of the three former European great powers during the last two centuries, 
Mearsheimer claims that wealth and the economic status is (but not always) a good 
indicator of latent power. He defines ―great powers‖ as states that have sufficient military 
potential to engage in conventional war against the most powerful state in the world. 
Mearsheimer claims that his theory focuses on great powers because ―the fortunes of all 
states—great powers and smaller powers alike—are determined primarily by the 
decisions and actions of those with the greatest capability‖ (2001, 5). According to him, a 
great power does not need to have capabilities to defeat the most powerful state, but it 
should be powerful enough to turn the conflict into a war of attrition that weakens the 
leading power, even though the later wins the war (2001, 5). The potential of the threat 
depends on the capabilities owned by each state. The most dangerous powers are those 
that possess greater military strength. 
 The third ―bedrock assumption‖ of the Mearsheimer‘s Offensive Realism is that 
states are suspicious of other states‘ intentions. States fear each other and believe that 
there cannot be any guaranty that states that possess military capabilities would not attack 
56 
 
other states. There may be many possible causes for confrontation and aggression that 
can be used by one state to attack the other. Intentions of the states can change rapidly, 
and so do alliances. The security dilemma embracing both the United States and Soviets 
during the Cold War is a perfect example and of absence of trust among States and of the 
maximization of power relative to the power of the others.  Another example is Iraq‘s 
aggression toward Iran in 1980. Iraq attacked Iran less than six years after they had 
signed in a ―brotherly‖ manner what is called The 1975 Algiers Agreement. It was an 
agreement to settle the borders dispute and to stop interference in internal affairs of each 
other. Soon, the aspiration for brotherhood was converted into an ambition for power and 
territory. The history of Iran showed us a plethora of cases in which Iran has been 
continuously under the threats and aggressions from other states.  
 The fourth principle holds that the survival is the primary goal of every state. 
There is no higher priority for a state than its survival. All the other goals succumb to the 
instinct of survival. Mearsheimer argues that states can also pursue non-security goals ―as 
long as the requisite behavior does not conflict with the balance-of-power logic‖ (2001, 
p. 46). If we had to consider the survival as an ideology, then we would define it as the 
only status quo ideology—the ultimate ideology that cannot be changed for or be 
subjugated to any other ideology. The invasions from Mongols and Tartars in thirteenth 
and fourteenth centuries, among others, remind Iranians of the fact that extermination and 
the very existential threats may still be present in today‘s world. 
 The last ―bedrock assumption‖ of Offensive Realism is that states are rational 
actors and behave based on their need to survive and on constraints provided to them by 
the international system. Mearsheimer argues that states get involved in game theory 
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through which ―they consider the preferences of other states and how their own behavior 
is likely to affect the behavior of those other states, and how the behavior of those other 
states is likely to affects their own strategy for survival‖ (2001, 31). 
 However, as Mearsheimer cautions us, none of these five ―bedrock assumptions‖ 
alone mandates that states behave competitively or aggressively. Taken together, these 
assumptions create powerful incentives and motivations for the states to think and act 
aggressively toward each others. In an anarchic international system, states realize that in 
order for them to survive, they have to account on self-help. The best way for states to 
ensure their survival is to become the most powerful state—global hegemony. 
Mearsheimer (2001, 35) summarizes this view as follow: 
“Given the difficulty of determining how much power is enough for today and 
tomorrow, great powers recognize that the best way to ensure their security is to 
achieve hegemony now, thus eliminating any possibility of a challenge by 
another great power. Only a misguided state would pass up an opportunity to 
become hegemony in the system because it thought it already had sufficient 
power to survive.”  
Thus, being under such conditions, states will never accept the status quo status of 
power until they dominate the entire international system. Mearsheimer cites Immanuel 
Kant when he says that ―It is the desire of every state, or of its ruler, to arrive at a 
condition of perpetual peace by conquering the whole world, if that were possible‖ (2001, 
34). Mearsheimer believes that a global hegemony is not possible and ―the world is 
condemned to perpetual great-power competition (2001, 2). He also distinguishes 
between the notion of global hegemony and the regional hegemony. The United States is 
just a regional hegemony due to the absence of other powers in the Western hemisphere. 
In order to be a global hegemony, the United States should be the only power in Asia and 
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Europe, which is not the case.   
In his theory, John Mearsheimer also argues that there are four main strategies 
through which a state can gain power relative to the powers gained from the other states. 
First, states gain power by going to war with the other rival states. Second, states gain 
power by threatening rival states to use military forces against them--‖blackmail‖. Third, 
the bait and bleed strategy causes to rivals to engage in a ―protracted war‖, so that ―they 
bleed each other white, while the baiter remains on sideline with its military strength 
intact‖ (Mearsheimer, 2001, 147-155). This is the case when one state causes other states 
to go in war with each other and the ―baiter‖ would be free in the future to expand its 
power. The last strategy that states implement to gain power is the bloodletting strategy, 
which aims at causing rival states to fight against each other in a long and costing 
conflict. 
On the other hand, states also aim at preventing other states from gaining power at 
their expenses. In order to achieve this goal, states implement two major strategies. The 
first strategy is balancing. Through this strategy, a great power ―assumes direct 
responsibility‖ to prevent another state from disturbing the current balance of power. The 
initial goal is to deter the aggressor. If this part of the strategy fails, then the balancing 
state will use its power to prevent the other state from disturbing the balance of power 
(2001, 156). The second strategy to prevent other states from gaining power is by using 
the buck-passing strategy. The state implementing this strategy attempts to get another 
state bear the burden of preventing, confronting, or even fighting against other state that 
aims at upsetting the balance of power. This strategy requires high diplomatic 
sophistication in order to ―pass the buck‖ to the other state (2001, 157-159).  
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Different Theoretical Perspectives 
 Offensive realism is an alternative theory to the structural realism theory of 
Kenneth N. Waltz (1979), also known as defensive realism. Both have their roots from 
the classical realism theory. The classical realism theory begins with the Thucydides‘ 
famous work The Peloponnesian War. Thucydides argues that power politics is a law of 
human nature. He maintains that the ―lust for power‖ and the ego to dominate the others 
are embedded in the human nature. Thucydides captured the Melian dialogue and defined 
it as a perfect example to validate his claims. In addition, Nicolo Machiavelli (1532) is 
another classical realist who argued that in the real world principles are subordinated to 
policies of the state. Machiavelli emphasized his notion of reason d‟état or reason of 
state and argued that ―the ultimate skill of the state leader is to accept, and adapt to, the 
changing power political configuration in world politics‖ (Baylis, Smith, and Owens 
2008, 96).  
In addition to the works and ideas of Thucydides and Machiavelli, Hans 
Morgenthau provided the fundamental principles of the classical realism. In his work 
Politics Among Nations (Morgenthau and Thomson 1985, 4), Morgenthau defines six 
main principles of political realism. First, politics is governed by ―objective laws that 
have their roots in human nature‖ (1985, 3). In order for a society to prosper and survive, 
it is imperative for the society to understand the laws by which it is governed. Second, 
Morgenthau also argues the main strategy to survive in international arena is to pursue its 
interests defined in terms of power (1985, 3). He claims that statesmen think and act in 
terms of interest defined as power (Mearsheimer 2001, 19). Third, the concept of interest 
defined as power is universal but is not fixed and ―affected by the circumstances of time 
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and place‖ (Morgenthau and Thompson 1985, 8). Fourth, the political realism is aware of 
the moral significance of political action. The classical realism theory maintains that 
―universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of the states‖. Those moral 
principles are defined based on circumstances of time and place (1985, 9). Fifth, political 
realism does not identify the moral principles of the state with the moral principles of the 
universe. Similar to Machiavelli, he supported the notion of reason d‟état and argued that 
beyond the frontier of a state there are no ethics or moral principles to which a state 
should obey. The only moral principle is the survival of the state. The self-help in an 
anarchic international system is the only moral duty.  Sixth, according to Morgenthau 
―the political realist maintains the autonomy of the political sphere, as the economist, the 
lawyer, and the moralist maintain theirs‖ (1985, 9). For a political realist there are no 
other standards of thought other than the political standards. The former are subordinated 
to the latter. Together with E. H. Carr (The Twenty Years‟ Crisis, 1919-1939), 
Morgenthau became a staunch proponent of realism during the Inter-War Debate (1919-
1939) with the proponents of Liberalism.  
Unlike Morgenthau and other classical realists, Kenneth Waltz argues that it is the 
anarchy that defines the international system and not the ―lust for power‖. Waltz claims 
that great powers are essentially aggressive not because of their ―lust for power‖ but 
because of their need to survive in the international system of politics. Waltz believes that 
states seek to maximize their security and not their power per se. In addition, according 
to Waltz, the structure of the international system forces the states to emphasize the 
balance of power. Morgenthau, on the other hand, considers the balance of power as a 
―universal concept‖ and defines it as ―a situation of equilibrium as well as any situation 
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in which power struggles take place‖ (Keohane 1986, 13). Moreover, Waltz attributes the 
security competition and the inter-state conflicts to the absence of a central global 
government. He defines the structure of the international system in terms of three main 
elements: (1) organizing principles, differential of units, and distribution of capabilities. 
The organizing principles are defined through the anarchic status of the international 
system and the hierarchical structure of the domestic order. Sovereign states are the units 
of the international system. Waltz considers the distribution of capabilities across the 
units of the system as the most important factor in defining and understanding the 
outcomes of the international politics (Baylis et al. 2008, 98). 
Moreover, Waltz differs with Mearsheimer when it comes to the question of the 
how much power states want to ensure their survival (Mearsheimer 2001, 21). Waltz 
argues that the international structure does not provide states with incentives to maximize 
their power. He argues that when great power behave aggressively and aim at 
maximizing their powers, they will encourage their potential victims to come together 
and balance against the aggressive state(s) (2001, 20). This scenario motivates states to 
be security maximizers, instead of being power maximizers, and follow strategies that 
would maintain the existing balance of powers. However, it needs to be clarified that 
offensive realism, like defensive realism, emphasizes the needs of the state to ensure their 
survival. While defensive realism finds the balance of power as the best strategy to 
ensure the survival of the state, offensive realism argues that the survival of a state can be 
ultimately ensured by reaching the hegemonic status. 
Other mainstream theories of international relations include liberalism, 
neoliberalism, social constructivism, and Marxist theories. Liberals argue that ―power 
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politics itself is the product of ideas, and ideas can change significantly (Baylis et al. 
2008, 110). They agree with the realists about the anarchic status of the international 
system. However, liberals claim that anarchy is a result of imperialism, failure of the 
balance of power, and problems with undemocratic regimes. The latter goes back to the 
Kantian argument to achieve perpetual peace by transforming individual consciousness, 
promoting Republican Constitutionalism, and abolishing war through a federal contract 
between states (2008, 112). Indeed, liberalism has gone through several waves. The first 
wave happened after the WWI, culminating with the League of Nations and interrupted 
by the WWII. The second wave occurred after the WWII and was interrupted by the Cold 
War. The third wave started after the fall of the Soviet Empire and was interrupted by the 
September 11
th
 attack on the American soil. The Democratic Peace Theory and 
Fukuyama‘s work The End of History and the Last Man (1992) have attempted to provide 
some grounds for liberalism. However, liberals have found it hard, so far, to succeed in 
their quest to ―domesticate international politics‖. 
Neoliberalism is another mainstream theory of international relation. David 
Baldwin identifies four varieties of liberalism: (1) commercial liberalism, (2) republican 
liberalism, (3) sociological liberalism, and (4) liberal institutionalism (1993). 
Neoliberalism, consistently, is used and defined under the principles of liberal 
institutionalism. There are several core assumptions of neoliberalism. First, states are the 
key actors in the international system but not the only significant ones. Second, states are 
guided by rationality and the quest to maximize their interests in issue-areas. Third, states 
seek the maximization of their absolute gains through cooperation. Fourth, the greatest 
obstacle to successful cooperation is cheating and noncompliance with the established 
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rules and contracts. Lastly, states will shift loyalty and resources to institutions if they are 
viewed as mutually beneficial and if these serve the international interests of the states 
and provide them with opportunities to secure those interests (Baylis et al. 2008, 132). 
These main principles are also elaborated in details in Keohane‘s work After hegemony: 
Cooperation and discord in the world political economy (2005). 
As one may realize, there are several disagreements between neorealists and 
neoliberals. While neorealists emphasize the importance of survival in an anarchic 
system, neoliberals minimize the importance of survival and claim that neorealists 
minimize the importance of international interdependence, globalization, and 
international regimes. While realists argue that cooperation depends on the will of the 
states, neoliberals argue that cooperation can be achieved in those issue-areas that states 
have mutual interests. While neorealists like Mearsheimer emphasize the relative gains, 
power, and security, neoliberals focus their attention on absolute gains, the economic 
welfare, and the international political economy. And while neorealists argue that 
capabilities are essential for security and independence, neoliberals argue that institutions 
and preferences are more important (Baylis et al. 2008, 133).  
However, some may argue that neorealists and neoliberals disregard some other 
factors. First, they both focus on states as the main actors of the international system and 
downplay the role of the domestic forces. In addition, they ignore the issues of political 
culture, domestic politics, ideology, and identity. Moreover, both neorealists and 
neoliberals ignore the fact that political activities may be shifting away from the state, 
especially in the new era of globalization or of the economic interdependence. 
Furthermore, they both struggle to properly define power and the real interests of the 
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states (2008, 135-136). 
Social constructivism is another alternative theory to neorealism theory. It is 
based on the thoughts of Max Weber and Emile Durkheim and is later developed by 
Michel Foucault, Alexander Wendt, Michael Barnet, James Fearon, and others. It is 
considered a social theory and has gained grounds since the 80s. Constructivism 
emphasizes the human consciousness and its role in international relations. The 
assumption that the world is socially constructed means that global change and 
transformation can be investigated (2008, 166-169). It deals with the social construction 
of the reality and argues that actors, both domestic and international, are created by the 
cultural environment. The social construction of reality defines and shapes people‘s 
behavior toward the system. In a response to neorealist and neoliberal consensus about 
the anarchic status of the international system, Alexander Wendt, a constructivist, stated 
that ―anarchy is what states make of it‖ (1992). 
Constructivists also argue that knowledge plays a crucial role on how individuals 
construct and interpret the world. In addition, constructivists consider rational choice 
theory (used by neorealists) as the logic of consequences and mock other theories for not 
emphasizing the logic of appropriateness and explaining global transformations. 
Regarding power, constructivists claim that the forces of power can be both material and 
ideational. Moreover, the effects of power ―go beyond the ability to change behavior‖ 
(Baylis et al. 2008, 165). Constructivists emphasize ―the diffusion and the 
internationalization and institutionalization of norms‖. This can be done through diffusion 
and institutional isomorphism. Diffusion deals with the concern of how a particular 
model, norm, practice, strategy, or belief spread within a population. Institutional 
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isomorphism is a process which maintains that ―those organizations that share the same 
environment will, over the time, resemble each other‖ (2008, 169). It is this process of 
internationalization and institutionalization of norms that promote conformity, 
socialization, and create a sense of ―international community, all of which may cause a 
significant change in global politics and world order. 
 Moreover, Marxist theories have continuously provided interesting ideas that have 
attracted a considerable number of scholars. Unlike neorealists who emphasize the role of 
the state in international system, Marxists see the state as the source of the problem and 
as an apparatus that serves the interests of one class, the capitalist class, at the expenses 
of the other class, the working class. Marxist theories share similarities with each other. 
They tend to analyze the social world as a totality. They claim that history, economics, 
politics, international relations, sociology, philosophy, etc. should be studied in totality. 
The academic division in different fields would not provide an accurate explanation of 
the reality because ―none can be understood without the knowledge of the others‖ (2008, 
145). Another ―key element‖ of the Marxist thought is the materialist conception of 
history. For Marxists, historical changes are related to and affected by economic changes. 
Means of production and relations of production form the economic base of a society. 
The mode of production influences the political, social, and intellectual life of a given 
society, known also as superstructure. A change in means of production and relations of 
production will cause changes in superstructure.  
One major Marxist theory is the World System Theory. The system theory was a 
result of a series of critiques on imperialism. The first major work to define a systemic 
approach was Lenin‘s Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism. Lenin argued that in 
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capitalist states, free competition gave way to monopoly capitalism. Within the world 
economy, the monopoly capitalism ―created a two-tier structure‖ consisting of capitalist 
states in the core exploiting the less developed states in the periphery. Bourgeoisie of the 
states in the core would appease their own proletariat by exploiting states in the 
periphery.  
The work of Lenin was followed by the Dependency School of Latin America led 
by Andre Günter Frank and Henrique Fernando Cardoso. Frank (1984) distinguished core 
and periphery by referring to them as metropole for developed capitalist states and 
satellite for underdeveloped states. He argued that metropole-satellite relations are also 
found at the international level. Frank argued that the most underdeveloped states are 
those that have had previous relations with metropoles. However, he acknowledges that 
there also exist opportunities for satellites to develop, especially in times of war. 
Another major work related to the Marxist though is the world-system theory of 
Immanuel Wallerstein. Wallerstein proposed a system whose structure comprised the 
core, semi-periphery, and periphery. He argues that capitalism is the driving force of the 
expansion, which he defines as ―as system of production for sales in a market for profit 
and appropriation of this profit on the basis of individual and collective ownership‖ (as 
cited in Baylis et al. 147). However, Wallerstein‘s world-system theory received 
continuous and significant critiques by Andre Günter Frank. Frank argued that the world 
system was far older than Wallerstein had presented it and has functioned based on the 
same process of capital accumulation (Frank and Gills 1996, 4). 
Lastly, Marxist theories also include Gramscianis, given after the name of the 
Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci. Gramsci was the first to make a detailed analysis on the 
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concept of hegemony. Gramsci argues that it is the hegemony of the ruling class that 
allows the moral, political, and cultural values of the dominant group to be broadly 
disperse throughout society and to be accepted by subordinate groups and classes as their 
own (Baylis et al. 2008, 150). This process takes place through the institutions of the civil 
society and hegemony is achieved when those values are considered to be ―common 
sense‖. According to Gramsci, a given order is defined by the historic bloc, which is a 
―mutual reinforced‖ and ―reciprocal relationship‖ between the socioeconomic relations 
(base) and political and cultural practices (superstructure) (2008, 150). The ideas of 
Gramsci were applied later by his supporters to define the international system. Other 
Marxist theories include critical theory and New Marxism, both of which do not play a 
significant role in the field of international relations.  
As we may realize, each of these theories presented here has a unique view of the 
world affairs. Despite similarities, they all see the world from different angles and have 
different principal approaches. However, just e few of these theories provide 
comprehensible explanations of the reality of the world‘s politics. Offensive realism 
theory of international relations is one of these theories. It provides an objective and 
rational approach to the issues of the international relations and clearly defines the nature 
of these relations. This study endeavors to prove that the security and foreign policy of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran is guided by the main principles of the theory of offensive 
realism. The following case studies will be used to validate this assumption. 
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Chapter Seven 
Iran‘s Policy During the Iran-Iraq War 
The Iran-Iraq War was the first event to reveal the true nature of the security and 
foreign policy of the Islamic Iran. Despite the reduction of the military expenditures and 
the decrease of power after the revolution, the new Islamic regime inherited from the 
Shah‘s regime a modernized army capable of challenging any other state in the region. 
During the 1978, Iran had spent over 15 percent of its total Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) on building its military capabilities (Geller and Singer 1998, 147). In 1978, Iran 
ground forces comprised three major field armies. Combat forces included three armored 
divisions, three infantry divisions, and four independent brigades. In addition, Iran 
inherited formidable air forces that included 460 combat aircraft (many of which were 
Tomcat fighters), spread in 14 air bases, and close to 100,000 men in personnel (1998, 
147). Moreover, the navy forces included three destroyer, eight fregates, three diesel 
submarines, and twenty-four missile patrol boats. In 1979, the Iranian armed forces 
numbered 415,000 men in active duty (1998, 147). In 1980, months before the outbreak 
of the war, Iran had oil revenue exceeding $26 billion (Karsh 2002, 14). 
 On the other hand, Iraq possessed a lesser military capabilities, compare to Iran. 
Iraq increased its military capabilities during the period between 1972 and 1980. In 1972, 
Iraq spent approximately fourteen percent of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 
advancing and strengthening its military power (Geller and Singer 1998, 147). In 1980, 
the military expenditure increased drastically to twenty-one percent of the GDP of the 
country. In addition, at the same time, Iraq numbered 212,000 men in the armed forces, 
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of which 28,000 were part of the air forces and 4,000 men in navy forces (1998, 148). 
This was an indication that Iran was far superior in naval power, despite the fact that Iraq 
had a force of ten patrol boats equipped with surface-to-surface missiles. In 1977, the 
army comprised four  armored divisions, two mechanized divisions, four infantry 
divisions, one independent armored brigade, and the Republican Guard mechanized 
brigade (1998, 148). To provide its army with sufficient expertise, Iraqi government 
collaborated with 2,000 Soviet advisors (1998, 148). 
 The war started less than six years after Iran and Iraq had signed what is called 
The 1975 Algiers Agreement. It was an agreement between both states to settle the 
borders dispute and to stop interference in internal affairs of each country. One main 
dispute involved the issue of the oil-rich and multi-ethnic province of Khuzestan, which 
borders Iraq. Due to the Arab (or non-Persian) majority of the province, Iraq claimed the 
historical right to control it. The disputes also involved the Iraq‘s claim about several 
small islands in the Persian Gulf that were occupied by the Iranian military. Moreover, 
the Shatt al-Arab waterway was another territorial dispute between Iraq and Iran. Due to  
Iraq‘s very limited access to the Persian Gulf, the control of the Shatt al-Arab waterway 
would become an economic and strategic gain for Iraq. Parties signed the Algiers 
Agreement under the promise to permanently stop the disputes and to restore good 
relationship and mutual cooperation. The promise for brotherhood between two countries 
soon turned into a war of destruction for many years to come.  
As mentioned previously, for some scholars, the war was the latest manifestation 
of the Arab-Persian struggle for the domination of the Gulf region. For some others, the 
war was just the extension of the historic struggle for power between Sunni (Iraq) and the 
70 
 
Shi‘a Islam (Iran). And for many others, the Iran-Iraq war was a struggle for power and 
dominance of the regional politics, following the decline of the Iranian power and 
Saddam‘s quest to become the new ―policeman of the region‖. Before him, the Shah of 
Iran had argued that ―the responsibility for maintaining Gulf security lay solely with the 
local states and that no external states were to be allowed to interfere in the affairs of the 
region‖ (Karsh 2002, 7). The Shah strongly believed that the military capability endowed 
Iran with the ―historical and the geopolitical obligation‖ to be the ―guardian of the Gulf‖. 
The Shah‘s doctrine can be compared to the Monroe Doctrine of the United States in the 
Western hemisphere and to the Brezhnev Doctrine of the Soviets in the Eastern Europe. 
The ambition of Saddam made no difference from that of the Shah.  
 However, the situation in the region changed rapidly and radically after the 
triumph of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 and the growing hostility between the 
Islamic government and the United States, especially after the Islamic conquest of the 
U.S. embassy in Tehran. For Iraq, the revolution could expand its impact in other regions 
of the Persian Gulf, and a potential Islamic Shi‘a movement would be a serious threat to 
the Iraqi regime. In addition, as mentioned previously, the Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein, 
perceived Iran as an easy target due to the vulnerability created internally by the 
revolution, the reduction of Iran‘s military power due to the U.S. cancellation of military 
aid after the conquest of the U.S. embassy, the demoralization of the army forces, 
systematic coups, and persecution and execution of many well-known political figures. 
This perception was strengthened by the assumption that by losing the American support, 
Iran had lost the political and military support from the West. Saddam also perceived a 
shift in military balance would favor Iraq. He thought that through war he would increase 
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the power and the influence of Iraq in the region. To all this can be added the Saddam‘s 
desire to make Iraq the hegemony of the region 
Following this perception, on September 22, 1980, Iraq launched a full-scale 
invasion of Khuzistan. As many would have predicted, the international community did 
not condemn the Iraq invasion of Iran, instead, the United Nations Security Council 
called for immediate cease-fire and the withdrawal of the military troops to the pre-war 
borders. Sir Anthony Parsons, a British Ambassador to the United Nations at that time, 
stated that the continuation of the hostage crisis had left Iran alone in the international 
stage of diplomacy (Ansari 2006, 98). In response to the invasion, the Islamic 
government of Iran mobilized the regular army, the Pasdaran, and Basij volunteers, 
including young boys and girls. The regime emphasized the notions of Ashoura, Karbala, 
Hussein, and the Shi‘a martyrdom. The Iraqi invasion of Iran unified Iran, consolidated 
the power of the Islamic Revolution, and undermined the moderate actors of the 
revolutionary coalition (Milani, 1994, 207).  
However, Israel and the United States were two other major actors that played a 
significant role on the conduct and the outcomes of the Iran-Iraq war. Throughout the 
war, the United States and Israel provided military assistance to both sides, depending on 
the course of the war. Previous to the fall of Shah in 1979, the Iranian-Israeli relations 
were friendly and very productive. In the early 1950, Iran de facto recognized the state of 
Israel. Relations between these two states were influenced by the fear that both countries 
had from other Arab countries in the region. Both countries had realized that it was 
through the cooperation with each other that they would be able to keep the regional 
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balance of power and confront Arabs. According to a 1979 CIA report on Mossad (Israeli 
Secret Service) 
―The main purpose of the Israeli relationship with Iran was the development 
of a pro-Israel and anti-Arab policy on the part of Iranian officials. Mossad 
has engaged in joined operation with SAVAK over the years since the late 
1950s. Mossad aided SAVAK activities and supported the Kurds in Iraq. The 
Israeli also regularly transmitted to the Iranians intelligence reports on 
Egypt's activities in the Arab countries, trend and developments in Iraq, and 
communist activities affecting Iran.‖ (as cited in Tarock 1998, 104) 
Their relations increased significantly in the mid-1970s when both countries reached an 
agreement through which Israel would provide military assistance to Iran in exchange for 
oil. This was in continuance of the Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi‘s saying that ―neither 
Iran nor Israel wants to be alone in a sea of Arabs.‖ (as cited in 1998, 103) 
 However, the victory of Islamic Revolution in 1979 severely damaged relations 
between two countries. The new Islamic regime closed the Israeli embassy in Tehran 
and, ironically, gave it to the Israeli's sworn enemy—Palestinian Liberation 
Organization (PLO). Another great event would shake the regional politics in the Middle 
East—Iraq would launch the invasion of Iran in September 1980. Having destroyed the 
relations with Israel, Iran was now being in a situation that Shah had warned about—
―alone in a sea of Arabs‖. For Israel, this was the best opportunity to re-instate relations 
with Iran in order to further its interests and to stop Iraq from gaining power. A powerful 
Sunni Iraq would become a far greater danger for the state of Israel compare to the 
danger coming from a powerful Iran. In case of a victor Iraq, Israel would be ―alone in a 
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sea of Arabs‖. However, in the case of a victor Iran, neither Israel nor Sunni Arabs would 
allow a powerful Iran to dominate the Middle East. For Iranians, they had to fight for 
their survival. In order to do so, Iran had to substantially increase its military capabilities.  
In his theory of offensive realism, John Mearsheimer argues that there are four 
main strategies through which a state can gain power relative to the others. First, states 
gain power by going to war with the other rival states. In our case, Iraq was the aggressor 
and Iran would need a powerful military arsenal to confront Iraq and win the war. The 
acquisition of military capabilities to survive the attack became the paramount goal of the 
Islamic Iran. Second, states gain power by threatening rival states to use military forces 
against them--‖blackmail‖. Iran did not have this privilege because it was already the 
victim of an aggression. Third, the bait and bleed strategy causes to rivals to engage in a 
―protracted war‖, so that ―they bleed each other white, while the baiter remains on 
sideline with its military strength intact‖ (Mearsheimer 2001, 147-155). This is the case 
when one state causes other state to go in war with each other and the ―baiter‖ would be 
free in the future to expand its power. In our case, Iran could not be an instigator of an 
aggression of which it would be a potential victim. The last strategy that states implement 
to gain power is the bloodletting strategy, which aims at causing rival states to fight 
against each other in a long and costing conflict. This last strategy provides significant 
explanation to the strategy followed by Iran, Israel, and the United States during the Iraq-
Iran war. Iran and Israel were bounded by the same interests. Iran needed weapons to 
survive the aggression from Iraq, which means following the war strategy. On the other 
hand, by providing weapons to Iran, Israel would make sure that Iran and Iraq would 
wage a prolonged war against each other and cause each other to ―bleed white‖. A long 
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and costing conflict would weaken both Iran and Iraq and would keep Israel in a more 
secure position. Thus, by promoting this strategy, Israel ―kills two birds with one 
stone‖—It destroys both Iran's and Iraq's military capabilities and reduces their influence 
in the region. This would also allow Israel to maintain the status quo of the balance of 
power. Despite the interests of Israel in a long and costing Iraq-Iran war, Iran had to 
acquire military capabilities in order to survive. The hostage crisis and the Iranian anti-
Western rhetoric discouraged Western powers from providing military assistance to Iran. 
Military capabilities provided by Washington during the Shah's reign were either 
destroyed or needed spare parts.  
While the United States and Israel were using bait and bleed and bloodletting 
strategies to increase their influence and power in the Middle East, Iran was facing a 
situation in which its survival was at stake. It was this need for survival that would lead 
Iran to cooperating with the Small Satan and the Great Satan. Indeed, Israel expressed its 
concerns soon after Iraq invaded Iran. In a press conference, the Israeli Foreign Minister 
Moshe Dayan called on the United States to forget the past events (especially the hostage 
crisis that was continuing at that time) and to provide assistance to Iran (Parsi 2007, 105). 
Ariel Sharon, then the Israeli Defense Minister, also emphasized the importance of 
assisting Iran in this war. He warned U.S. of any possible Soviet intervention in Iran.  
All these concerns prepared the stage for what is known as the Operation Seashell 
(Bergman 2008, 40-48). This secret operation was implemented by Israel and aimed at 
providing Iran with weapons to fight against Iraq. For Israel, there were four main 
reasons to support Iran: (1) Israel hoped that by helping Iran and Khomeini in this 
situation would ease relationship between two states; (2) Israel hoped that by providing 
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arms to Iran, it would cause the war to intensify and increase the possibility for mutual 
destruction (This strategy reminds us of the bloodletting strategy); (3) by supporting Iran, 
Israel aimed at diminishing the threat coming from a possible victorious Saddam; and (4) 
the Israeli weapons industry sought to make money through this opportunity (Bergman 
2008, 43).  
Due to its desperate need for weapons to stop Iraqi invasion, Iran was willing to 
buy weapons from everyone, including the Great and Small Satans (Milani 1994, 212). 
The first deal under the operation seashell was made by Israel through an Iranian arms 
dealer and a French intermediary. It included the purchase of 250 tires for Phantom jet 
fighters, communication equipment, 106mm recoilless guns, ammunitions, and mortars 
(Bergman 2008, 44). The operation continued later through a Portuguese arms dealer 
named George Piniol. For Iranians, the deals were conducted under the close surveillance 
and patronage of Dr. Sadeq Tabatabai, who was a distant relative to Khomeini and a very 
credible person to the Supreme Leader. Tabatabai identified himself as a representative of 
the Defense Council of the Revolution, which held considerable power within the power 
structure and was the primary actor of Iran‘s security and intelligence system. Piniol 
began his first deal with the purchase by Iranian of 150 M-40 antitank guns and 24,000 
shells for each gun. Iranians had provided Piniol with a detailed list about the items to be 
bought. The list included spare parts for tanks and aircraft engines, shells for 106mm 
recoilless rifles and for 130mm, 203mm, and 175mm guns, and TOW vehicle-mounted 
launchers and missiles (2008, 45). 
The Israeli technology and arms company Elul realized that everything Iran 
needed was available in the warehouse of the Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) and the 
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Israel Military Industries. Some of the items needed by the Iranians were in the Israel 
Defense Forces Stockpiles. The arsenal planned to be given to the Iranians included a 
total of 360 tons of spare parts and ammunitions. In order to avoid any possible scandal, 
Piniol managed to get officials of the Argentinean airline Transporte Aereo Rioplatense 
to conduct the transportation of the military arsenal to Iran. This deal included eighteen 
flights, with each flight carrying twenty tons of spare parts and ammunitions. The total 
cost to be paid by Iran was $75 million (2008, 45). In mid-1981, an Argentinean plane 
carrying military supplies from Israel to Iran crashed in the Soviet Union borders with 
Turkey (Tarock 1998, 106). However, this incident did not stop the operation. It needs to 
be mentioned that besides Piniol‘s deals, there existed many other channels through 
which Israel sold arms to Iran. According to another arm dealer working at that time for 
the Iranian government, approximately 80 percent of the weapons sold to Iran soon after 
the beginning of the war came from Israel (Parsi 2007, 106). It was due to this weaponry 
support from Israel that Iran managed to turn the tide of the war to its advantages. 
Based on Mearsheimer's theory of offensive realism, the United States would 
behave as an offshore balancer of power and would suppress any tentative made by any 
state to reach the status of a regional hegemony. Fearing that Iraq (in case of victory 
against Iran) would elevate itself to a regional hegemon, the Americans saw Iran as the 
main actor at the opportune time to stop Iraq from reaching that status. In addition to this 
strategy, the Americans sought to prevent the Soviets from increasing their influence in 
Iran and in the region. However, once the American officials realized that Iran was 
gaining strength, they immediately launched an anti-Iran strategy. This strategy consisted 
oj supporting Iraq both directly and indirectly, financially and militarily. In 1982, the 
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U.S. State Department removed Saddam from the department‘s list of ―sponsors of 
terrorism‖, and in 1984, diplomatic relations with Baghdad were established. Also, in 
1984, the Reagan administration launched the Operation Staunch, which aimed at 
stopping the flow of arms to Iran. The first effect of this new operation was the downing 
of an Iranian F-4 plane from an Arab F-15 in May 1984. This opened the way for U.S. to 
provide military assistance to Arabs, which included 400 Stinger missiles, 200 missile 
launchers, and the deployment of a CENTCOM KC-10 tanker aircraft (Marschall 2003, 
183). Iraq also became the largest importer of weapons in the region. The Soviets became 
the main providers of arms for Iraq. The West Germany also assisted Iraq in building 
chemical and biological weapons, which were used later by Saddam against Kurds and 
Iranians. France provided Iraq with aircraft and long-range bombers. The Iran-Iraq war 
became a concern when Iraq began the tanker war, which consisted of attacks on oil-
transporting ships in the Persian Gulf. This type of war endangered the U.S. interests in 
the Gulf. The U.S. navy soon became involved in this type of war by supporting Iraq and 
attacking the Iranian navy.  
Meanwhile, another affair would shake the international community, especially 
the politics of Iran, Israel, and the United States. This affair came to be known as the 
Iran-Contra affair and consisted of illegal arms support from U.S. and Israel to Iran in 
exchange for hostages and money for Contras in Nicaragua. The Iran-Contra affair, 
which became public in November of 1986, became the first major (public) event to 
question the ideological approach of Iran's authorities on security and foreign policy in 
the region. Being under the persistent threat from Iraq, Iranian leadership was willing to 
trade their Shi‘a ideological for the ultimate ideology of survival in the international 
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system of politics. Both the ―Great‖ and the ―Small Satan‖ could supply Iran with 
military capabilities that Iran so desperately needed to confront Iraq. This opened the 
stage for the Iran-Contra affair, which engaged Iran, Israel, and U.S., altogether.  
The idea to circumvent the Operation Staunch was first planned at a meeting in 
Hamburg in late 1984 between several Israelis (arms dealers and political advisers) with 
close ties to high-ranking Israelis officials and the Iranian arms dealer Manuchehr 
Ghobanifar, a close collaborator of the powerful head of the Majles, Ali Akbar Hashemi 
Rafshanjani. Iran was in a desperate need for spare parts and other weaponry assistance. 
The operational capabilities of the Iranian Air Forces were drastically lowered after the 
1982 offensive and due to the absence of spare parts. This problem became a priority 
concern when Saddam launched the War of the Cities attack on Iran through aerial 
bombardments (Ansari 2006, 109). They realized that Israel would be the best 
intermediary to convince the Americans to provide spare parts weapons for the Iranian 
army. Rafsanjani, a high-profile Shi‘a clergy and a close collaborator to Khomeini, gave 
clear indications that Iran was in a desperate need to restock its military arsenal even 
though a collaboration of the United States. 
The Americans joined the plot in the summer of 1985. In July, President Reagan 
authorized contacts with the Iranian authorities, and in August he gave the ―green light‖ 
for the operation to begin. Through the secret negotiations, the United States aimed at 
releasing the U.S. citizens taken hostages by the Lebanese Shi‘ite terrorist organization 
Hezbollah, preventing the Soviet expansion in Iran, stabilizing the oil prices, and 
collecting money for Contras in Nicaragua (Marschall 2003, 183). Based on the report of 
the Congressional Committee investigating the Iran-Contra affair, U.S. provided Iran, 
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through two weapons shipments, to Iran, with 504 TOW missiles (Hamilton and Inouye 
1987, 169). The report of the Congressional Committees investigating the Iran-Contra 
affair, among other things, argued: 
―Tehran had its own agenda. Rhetoric not withstanding—the United States was 
considered 'The Great Satan' and Israel a blasphemy—Tehran wanted modern 
tanks and high-technology antitank and anti-aircraft missiles to encounter 
Iraq's Soviet-made fighter planes and modern tanks. It needed spare parts to 
maintain the arsenal of weapons that the Shah had purchased from the United 
States.‖ (1987, 163) 
 
 According to one source, with assistance from Israel, the United States secretly 
provided Iran through six shipments with more than 2,000 TOW anti-tank missiles, 235 
Hawk anti-aircraft missiles, and considerable spare parts, all of which with a cost of 
about $64 million (Marschall 2003, 183). At the same time, the Americans provided Iraq 
with military intelligence and AWACS planes. According to another source, weaponry 
shipments occurred as follow: on August 20
th
 1985 were shipped 96 TOW missiles, on 
September 14
th
 were shipped 408 TOWs, on November were shipped Hawks missiles, 
and on February 19
th
 1986 were shipped 500 TOWS (Wroe 1991, ii-iii). On May 23
rd
, an 
American delegation headed by the former national security advisor, Robert McFarlane, 
went to Tehran for direct talks about the hostage issues, taking with them Hawk spare 
parts. The shipments continued in August and October.  
On the beginning of November, a Beirut magazine published details of 
McFarlane‘s trip to Tehran. This information was leaked to the newspaper by Mehdi 
Hashemi, an associate of Ayatollah Ali Montazeri. Montazeri was at that time the 
designated successor to Khomeini‘s office and a fierce opponent of Rafsanjani. This 
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event cost Montazeri his political career. The irony of the fact is that Hashemi who 
revealed the secret dealings with U.S and Israel was executed by the Islamic regime and 
Rafsanjani who orchestrated the dealings remained free and untouchable from the 
regime. In addition, leaders of the two countries, of U.S. and Iran, both refuted the fact of 
having information about the secret dealings. Surprisingly, after such controversies, they 
both promoted aggressive policies and rhetoric against each other. 
Thus, based on the above information, the Iran-Iraq war serves as a good 
indicator to define the main factors that shaped the security and foreign policies of states 
involved in this affair. Both Iran and Iraq possessed significant military capabilities. The 
history has shown Iran to be suspicious of the intentions of other neighboring countries 
like Iraq. Agreements like the 1975 Algiers Agreement did little to stop Iraq from 
invading Iran. It was the shift in the balance of power favoring Iraq that created the 
premises for Iraq to attack Iran. On the other hand, Iran's ultimate ideology of survival 
dominated any other ideological predisposition. The need for survival led Iranian leaders 
to enter in secret negotiations with countries they considered the Great and the Small 
Satans. These negotiations helped Iran increase its military capabilities in order to 
survive the Iraqi invasion. Israel and the United States, on the other hand, entered the 
negotiations for different reasons. Israel needed to prevent any disturbance of the balance 
of power in the region that would jeopardize Israel's security and survival. Its goal to 
diminish the Iranian and Iraqi power and influence in the region through the bloodletting 
strategy became a priority for the Israelis. Moreover, the Iran-Iraq war reveals the role of 
the United States as the ―offshore balancer‖. Its goal was to not allow any state to reach 
the status of the regional hegemony that would upset the balance of power. 
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Chapter Eight 
Iran‘s Policy Toward the Russian-Chechen Conflict 
Why studying the Russian-Chechen conflict as pertinent case in analyzing Iran's 
security and foreign policy? The answer is simple: Because Chechnya is a republic 
predominantly of Muslim population and Russia has been historically a threat to the 
Iranian sovereignty. According to 2002 census, Chechnya had a population of 1.1 
million, 93.5% of whom were Muslims. The Article 3(16) of the Islamic Constitution of 
Iran enumerates that the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has the duty of 
directing all its resources to, among others, the goal of ―framing the foreign policy of the 
country on the basis of Islamic criteria, fraternal commitment to all Muslims, and 
unsparing support to the freedom fighters of the world‖. On the other hand, as analyzed 
previously, Iran still has fresh memories of the Russian-Persian wars which resulted in 
the signing of the Treaty of Gulistan (1813) and the Treaty of Turkomanchai (1826). Both 
these treaties annexed Iranian territories in favor of Russia. The Anglo-Soviet invasion of 
1941 reminds Iranians that history may repeat itself. Thus, Iran has all the reasons to fear 
it neighboring Russia. 
During the era of the Soviet Empire, Chechnya, together with Ingushetia, formed 
an autonomous republic under the jurisdiction of the federal government. The collapse of 
the Soviet Union was followed by a Chechen independence movement led by the former 
Soviet air force general Dzhokar Dudayev. On October 27
th
 1991, the Chechen Central 
Election Commission held presidential and parliamentary elections, which were won by 
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Dudayev by a plebiscite vote (Graney 2004, 122). On November 1
st
 of the same year, 
Dudayev issued decree declaring the Chechen Republic a ―sovereign state‖. The 
parliament ratified the decree the next day. For Dudayev, his supporters, and the Russian 
authorities in Moscow this meant a de facto declaration of independence and an act of 
secession from the Russian Federation (2004, 122). Boris Yeltsin, then the head of the 
federation, reacted fiercely by imposing martial law in the Chechen Republic and sending 
600 federal troops of the Interior Ministry to Chechnya. Faced with a strong Chechen 
opposition, the federal troops failed to complete their mission. This opened the stage for a 
long-term conflict between Chechen separatists and the Russian federal troops. 
The conflict escalated from 1994 to 1996 in what is called the First Chechen War. 
For the Russians, the war against the Chechens became a proactive strategic movement 
that would prevent other republics from demanding secession. For the Chechen forces, it 
became a war of independence and of survival. The results of this war were tragic. The 
number of casualties (including Chechen and Russian troops and civilians) up to 
February of 1995 varied from 5,000 to 35,000, depending on the source (Seely 2001, 
258). The ―storming of Grozny‖ by the federal troops caused the displacement and killing 
of thousands of civilians. During the 21 months of the first Chechen war, nearly 40%, 
(400,000 to 600,000 people) of the Chechen pre-war population was displaced from their 
homes and fled to neighboring republics (Global Security.org n.d.; Holland 2004, 335).  
The Second Chechen War, which began in 1999 and continued until the 
restoration of the federal government, increased the scale of atrocities conducted against 
the civilian population on both sides. In their quest to crush Chechen separatists, the 
Russian forces perpetrated extra-legal and summary executions, forced disappearance, 
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tortures, rapes, attacks and assassination of civilians, and other horrendous crimes 
(Holland 2004, 336).  
 Seeing that the profile of Chechnya's population is predominantly of Muslim 
population and that it was fighting for their own freedom against a non-Muslim 
(Christian) country, many would believe that Iran would side with Chechnya to condemn 
the Russian aggression. The Constitution of Iran clearly demands the government to 
frame its foreign policy based on ―Islamic criteria, fraternal commitment to all Muslims, 
and unsparing support to the freedom fighters of the world‖. Iran had previously followed 
this constitutional obligation in the Middle East by supporting the Palestinian cause and 
by promoting aggressive policies against the Israeli and the U.S. involvement in the 
region. Iran, like no other Muslim state, has relentlessly condemned Israel‘s and the U.S. 
policies in the Middle East, considering them anti-Islam policies. The U.S. involvement 
in Iraq and Afghanistan are two other cases in which the Iranian fierce rhetoric has 
received a prime-time focus. Not only was Iran vehemently supporting its Muslim 
brothers in Middle East, but it was also supporting every Muslim cause around the globe. 
Not only was it providing support for its Shi‘a brothers of Hezbollah, but it was also 
providing assistance to its Sunni counterpart, Al Qaeda. Thus, rarely we can find news 
from the Muslim world where Iran has had no blueprint on it. 
 However, as strange as it may sound, the Iranian policy toward the Russian-
Chechen conflict was completely different from the other cases mentioned previously. 
While many other Muslim countries condemned the Russian aggression on Chechnya, it 
became obvious that Iran had no intention of jeopardizing its ―fruitful relations‖ with 
Russia. It was not a common political relationship. It was ―a strategic relationship‖ 
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(Freedman 2000, 70). It was the time again for Iran to set aside its ideological 
predispositions. In March 1996, months before the end of the First Chechen War, the 
Iranian Foreign Minister, Ali Akbar Velayati, in a visit to Moscow, stated that Iranian-
Russian relations were ―at their highest level in contemporary history‖ (as cited in 2000, 
71). In 1999, then the Iranian Foreign Minister, Kamal Kharrazi, expressed this political 
position to his Russian counterpart, Igor Ivanov, by adding that Tehran was ready ―to 
undertake effective collaboration in the struggle against terrorists to destabilize the 
situation in Russia‖ (as cited in Samii 2001, 49). Russian diplomats responded by stating 
that the Iranian policy toward the Chechen conflict promised for productive bilateral 
relations between two countries.  
 In 1999, Iran became the head of the Organization of the Islamic Conference 
(OIC). This new position obligated Iran to serve and protect the welfare of all Muslims 
around the world. Despite this fact, Iran‘s policy toward Russia did not show any 
significant change. The Iranian rhetoric against the Russian invasion of Chechnya was 
sporadic and without resonance. In the midst of the Second Chechen War, in early 
January 2000, President Sayyed Mohammed Khatami congratulated Vladimir Putin on 
assuming the office of the Russian President and emphasized the hopes for further 
intensification of contacts with Moscow (Malek 2008, 2). Vladimir Putin was then the 
Prime Minister and one of the leading Russian strategists of the Russian-Chechen 
conflict. In 2003, Hamid Reza Assefi, the Iranian representative of the Ministry of the 
Foreign Affairs, declared that the conflict was an ―internal affair‖ of Russia:  
―We tolerate all measures of Russia that are peaceful and aimed at respecting 
and guaranteeing the rights of Russia's multinational population, including the 
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Muslims. Iran welcomes the respect the Russian Federation pays to the many 
representatives of the Islamic faith and, by all means, considers the problem 
with the Chechen Republic to be an internal Russian affair.‖ (as cited in Malek 
2008, 2) 
   The Chechen's field commander Chechen field commander Shamil Basayev 
adamantly responded to the Iranian statements that the war was Russia‘s ―internal affair‖. 
In an open letter to the Iranian leadership, Basayev asked a series of questions which 
questioned the Islamic ideology of the Iranian government. Among others, he questioned:  
―Since when have the infidels become closer to you than the Muslims?”, “Who 
released you from Jihad?”, “Why is the murder of Muslims an internal affair for 
the infidels?”, “If Ichkeria [Chechnya] is Russia‟s internal affair, why is Iran 
not the U.S.A.‟s internal affair?”, “Is it not better to be terrorists in the eyes of 
the infidels than hypocrites in the eyes of God?”, and  “Iran is the closest 
neighbor of the Caucasus and Chechnya. Is it not your direct duty before God . . 
. in accordance with Sharia, to take part in Jihad and support the Muslims 
waging war for Islam?‖ (as cited in Samii 2001, 50)  
For Chechens, Iran had become an agent of Russia from whom they could not hope for 
support. Despite the main theme of the Iranian foreign policy toward Russia-Chechen 
conflict, in 2005, rumors were spread to indicate that Iranian Revolutionary Guard had 
used its training camps to train Chechen fighters and launch then back in battlefields of 
Chechnya. However, these rumors did not have any significant impact on Iran-Russia 
cooperation.  
In addition, other Muslim countries and organizations responded to the Chechen 
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conflict by focusing their attacks mostly on Russia. Allahshukur Pashazade, head of the 
Spiritual Board of Muslims of the Caucasus, declared that regardless of its statements 
―from the very beginning up to now the Russian empire has been against the Muslim 
religion and Muslims‖(2001, 51). Furthermore, the Egyptian Foreign Minister Amir 
Musa commented that ―in the future meeting of the OIC foreign ministers, top priority 
should be given to the Chechnya crisis, and it is essential that the Islamic states adopt 
united stances on this issue‖ (2001, 51). In addition, Usamah al-Baz, political advisor to 
the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, ―emphasized that the method of deploring and 
condemning aggression was not the ideal treatment of the tragedy of the Chechen people‖ 
(2000, 51). The government of Afghanistan acted aggressively by recognizing the 
independence of Chechnya and stated that ―It is not justifiable for the Islamic countries to 
turn their back on the Chechen nation in the name of their international expediencies‖ 
(2001, 52). In order to defend their position toward the conflict, the Iranian officials 
declared that the Chechen rebel forces ―were backed by ‗external forces‘ which were 
enemies of Iran and Russia alike‖, referring to the involvement of the U.S. and Turkey 
(Malek 2008, 4). Besides admitting the fact that Iran was not supporting Chechen 
movement, this excuse did little to justify in the eyes of the other Muslim states Iran‘s 
policy toward the Chechen conflict.  
 The Iranian policy toward the Russian-Chechen conflict brings forth the 
questions: ―Why didn't Iran support its Muslim brothers in Chechnya?‖ and ―Why did 
Iran side with Russia?‖ This brings up the main argument of this study, which states that 
the Iranian security and foreign policy is guided by its ultimate ideology of survival and 
the main principles of the offensive realism. Iran's cooperation with Russia and its neutral 
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position during the Chechen struggle for freedom is a product of an Iranian rational 
choice. Iran calculated and feared that a support for the Chechens would cause Russia to 
stop providing military assistance and military-related technology that Iran so desperately 
needed. In addition, in supporting the Chechen separatist movement, Iran would 
inadvertently encourage the Azeri separatist movement in Northwestern Iran, or fearing 
that Russia would support the separatist movements in Iran in a retaliatory strategy. Thus, 
the main strategy leading the security and foreign policy of the Islamic Iran toward 
Russian-Chechen conflict was to enhance its military capabilities and to prevent any 
separatist movements within its territory. The paramount goal leading to this strategy was 
the survival of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its sovereignty. 
 Since its birth, the major threat to the Islamic Republic of Iran has been the 
subversive regional strategy of the United States. The United States came out of the Cold 
War victorious and more powerful. More important, there was no other great power 
capable of challenging its domination of the international system. Russia was suffering 
from radical changes in its political and economic system. China was struggling with its 
economy, and Europe had its own problems at home. The other powers were looking at 
U.S. to launch its new post-Cold War strategy from which they might profit. The Islamic 
Republic of Iran had seen U.S as the major threat to its existence. In January of 1995, 
U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher openly called for an overthrow of the Islamic 
regime by stating: ―We must isolate Iraq and Iran until there is a change in their 
governments, a change in their leadership‖ (as cited in Gerges 1999, 132). Some 
considered this reaction as being part of Christopher's past experience with Iran when the 
hostage crisis vanished his hopes to be Secretary of State under the Carter administration. 
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In addition, there had been prevailing assumptions among the Iranian leadership that the 
primary goal of the United States was to change the Islamic regime.   
However, many may consider the security relationship with Russia to be an 
anomaly because Iran historically has seen Russians with a deep suspicion. Russians, 
alone and in collaboration with the British forces, had conquered and annexed territories 
that previously belonged to the Persian Empire. They had sought to divide Iran into 
spheres of influence. In order to ensure its regime survival, Iran's leadership put the 
emphasis on military capabilities and decided to increase its capabilities by cooperating 
with the Russian Federation, after having relied for decades on U.S. military assistance 
and weapons. At the same time, Iran would rely on U.S. to avoid any possible aggressive 
tentative by the Russians to extent their influence in Iran. This was the same strategy that 
Iran followed during the 19
th
 century when Russia and the Great Britain struggled with 
each other for the domination of Iran. At that time, Iran played the role of the balancer. 
While the Americans might have not liked the current Iranian regime, they would 
(inadvertently) have played the role of the Iranian defender by not allowing any Russian 
expansion in its former ―protectorate‖. Thus, Iran was protected by both the United States 
and Russia. Iran was also, at the same time, playing the role of the balancer. The situation 
would have changed only if the two great powers (U.S. and Russia) would have reached a 
consensus regarding Iran. That would have been very dangerous for Iran. Russia, on its 
part, would have supported Iran, motivated by the goal to minimize the U.S. influence in 
the Middle East. As the offensive realism also maintains, the Iranian leaders recognized 
that the more military capabilities they gained, the more secure they would be from the 
foreign dominance and invasion. Besides the traditional military arsenal, the Iranians 
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realized that possessing nuclear capability would dramatically increase their power and 
influence and would ensure their survival.  
Tentative to expand it military power had started in 1989 when Iran launched an 
ambitious effort to rebuild its military potential and transform itself into a regional 
military power. Iran's military arsenal at that time included 100-200 combat aircraft; 
1,000-2,000 armored vehicles; several submarines; and as many as a dozen missile boats 
(Eisenstadt, 2001). Parallel with this military strategy, Iran had accelerated its tentative to 
enhance its missile technology, which culminated on February 3
rd
, 2009 with the 
launching of the first satellite into space (Fathi and Broad, 2009). Having a sophisticated 
missile technology would give Iran significant advantage in fighting against other 
aggressive states, which cannot be reached by the conventional weapons in Iran's 
disposition. It also would provide Iran with the capability to deliver warheads to 
distanced locations.  
 The first main agreement between Iran and Russia dated back in 1989 when 
Rafsanjani negotiated with the Soviets in Moscow. Russia inherited this agreement and 
implemented part of the agreement due to the Russian demand for direct payment and the 
Iranian lack of economic power to buy them all. From this agreement, Iran received 422 
T-72 tanks, 413 BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles, and self-propelled artillery; SA-5 and 
SA-6 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs); 12 Su-24 and 24 MiG-29 fighters; and three Kilo-
class submarines, along with advanced torpedoes and mines (Eisenstadt 2001; Samii 
2001, 55). Meanwhile, U.S. feared that the Iranian arsenal could destabilize the balance 
of power in the region and forced the Russians to stop their transfer of technology and 
military capabilities to Iran. Under the American pressure, the Russian President Boris 
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Yeltsin pledged to stop the arms trade with Iran in September 1994. In June of 1995, 
Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and the U.S. Vice President Al Gore 
signed an agreement in which Russia promised to ―fulfill existing contracts by the end of 
1999 and would not sign any new ones‖ (Eisenstadt 2001).  
Despite the Gore-Chernomyrdin Agreement, the Russian and Iranian officials 
allegedly met in early 1997 to discuss new arms deals. These supposedly involved the 
possible sale of eight Su-25 attack aircraft; 25 Mi-17 transport helicopters; hundreds of 
T-72 tanks; 500-1,000 SA-16/18 Igla shoulder-launched SAMs; several battalions of SA-
10 and SA-12 SAMs; air-surveillance radars; and several other items (Eisenstadt 2001). 
In violation of the agreement, Russia transferred to Iran other five Mi-17s starting in 
January 2000, while in November 2000, an Israeli newspaper reported ―the imminent 
departure of a shipment‖ of 700 SA-16/18 Igla missiles for Iran (2001). In the middle of 
the Second Chechen War, in November of 2000, Russia officially nullified the Gore-
Chernomyrdin agreement and together with Iran signed another agreement that would 
start a new phase in the military and technology cooperation. 
 However, acquiring military capabilities and power was not Iran's goal in itself. 
The real goal was to acquire military capabilities that would surpass the capabilities of 
other states in the region. This phenomenon deals with the main realist/neorealist 
concepts of relative and absolute gains. According to Joseph Grieco, states aim at 
increasing their power and influence (absolute gains) through cooperation with other 
states (as cited in Baylis, Smith, and Owens, 2008, p. 129). However, states are always 
concerned about the gains of other states in multilateral or bilateral cooperation (relative 
gains). In its cooperation with Russia, Iran aimed at increasing its regional power in 
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influence. Iran was not concerned about the relative gains of Russia because Russia was 
already significantly superior to Iran and U.S. was far superior to not allow Russia to 
threaten Iran's sovereignty or to disturb the balance of power. Indeed, Iran sought to use 
the absolute gains extracted from cooperation with Russia to increase its power and 
influence in the Middle East. This would create the premises for reaching the status of the 
regional hegemony, which in turn would provide more security for Iran. The Iran's 
nuclear ambition provided sufficient and credible support to this argument. 
The Iran's nuclear ambitions date back in the Shah era, but they were 
reinvigorated in the midst of the Iran-Iraq war due to the perceived threat to its 
sovereignty coming from Iraq. Having the Germans abandoning the project following the 
Islamic Revolution, Iran relied on Soviets to pursue its nuclear ambitions. The Iran-Iraq 
war reminded the Iranians of the fact that the international system was anarchic and self-
help and preparedness were the most effective ways to deal with possible foreign 
aggressions. In January 1995, Iran and Russia signed an agreement which dealt with the 
construction by the Russian specialists of a nuclear power plant at Bushehr. In July 2002, 
notwithstanding the U.S. opposition, Russia declared that it would help Iran build five 
additional nuclear reactors. Russian nuclear cooperation with Iran caused severe 
diplomatic disagreements between the United States and Russia. The Americans saw the 
Russian nuclear assistance to Iran as part of the Russian strategy to undermine the U.S. 
interests in the Middle East. Regardless of these disagreements, Iran‘s nuclear activity 
intensified in 1999. This intensification of the nuclear program happened in a time when 
the U.S. government was attempting to establish relations with Iran whose government 
was supposedly led by the reformers.  
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The nuclear program became an international issue in 2002 when it was revealed 
that Iran had secretly built fuel cycle facilities. The pursuit of the nuclear program had a 
little rationality to support the argument that its final product would be for economic 
purpose. The American leaders demanded Russia to not supply any nuclear fuel to the 
Bushehr reactor unless Iran agreed to send all used fuel back to Moscow. In addition to 
the American demands, Moscow should withhold the nuclear fuel until Iran signed an 
additional protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) permitting that 
agency unannounced visits to all Iranian nuclear facilities (Freedman 2006, 19). This 
discovery caused the head of the IAEA, Muhammad Al Baradei, to visit Tehran in 2003. 
Al Baradei urged Iran to stop the nuclear activity and ratify the Additional Protocol (AP) 
with the EU-3 (Great Britain, Germany, and France). Being under pressure from IAEA 
and fearing possible U.S. military action, Iran accepted and signed the agreement. Since 
then, Iran has systematically violated any agreement and broken any promise it has made 
to the international community. The Iranian-Russian nuclear cooperation still continues 
today, raising serious concerns about the outcome of this cooperation. This revelation and 
the future events that follow Iran's nuclear ambitions have given Iran a new status and 
profile in international arena.  
However, the main questions that most political scientist and politicians face 
today are: (1) what is the goal of Iran in pursuing the nuclear program? and (2) what 
factors shape this goal? In following the principles of the offensive realism, the argument 
holds that Iran's nuclear program is an extension and growth of the military capabilities to 
insure the survival of the Islamic Republic. To insure its survival, Iran seeks to militarily 
dominate other states in the region. As a consequence, Iran aims at increasing its military 
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power until the status of the regional hegemony is achieved. Shahram Chubin argues that 
there are four main goals that drive Iran toward a nuclear capability (2006, 8-13). First, it 
is the goal to deter other countries from taking any possible military actions against Iran. 
The Iraqi invasion of Iran showed the importance of possessing sufficient military 
capabilities to deter attacks from hostile states. Possessing a nuclear arsenal would 
provide Iran with significant capability to retaliate against any military attack from 
outside. Facing retaliation, foreign forces would be reluctant to attack Iran due to their 
fear of a very costly conflict. Other forces are aware that this may lead to a mutual 
assured destruction (MAD). Second, a nuclear arsenal would increase the Iranian 
influence in the region. As previously mentioned, this is not a new idea for Iranians. It is 
an idea that dates back during the times of Cyrus and Darius the Great, idea that was 
revived during the Shah‘s era. Its history and the geographical location make the Iranian 
leaders believe that they are entitled to a privileged status in the Middle East, and 
probably in the world. Third, a nuclear arsenal would give Iran significant bargaining 
power in dealing with regional and global issues. Lastly, the nuclear program would be a 
nationalist card for regime legitimation. The new Islamic government considers the 
nuclear arsenal a powerful tool that would make Iran independent of other states and 
would ensure the survival of the regime. The fate of the nuclear program will also be the 
fate of the regime. Russia happened to be its strategic partner in achieving (or even 
coming closer to achieving) these paramount goals. As a rational actor, Iran would never 
jeopardize this productive and strategic relationship.  
 Lastly, the territorial integrity played a crucial role in shaping Iran's position 
toward the Russian-Chechen conflict. Iran feared that an independent Chechnya would 
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encourage minorities within Iran to strive for their independence. Potential separatist 
movements might come from Azeris in Northwest, Arabs in South, Kurds in West, 
Turkmen in Northeast, and Baluchis in Southeast of Iran. Iran had previously sided with a 
Christian country (Armenia) in its struggle against a Muslim country (Azerbaijan) in 
order to prevent any future separatist movement from growing in its Northern borders. 
This fear urged the Iranian Defense Ministry official Alireza Akbari to declare that 
Russian-Chechen conflict was a result of the threat that Chechen movement posed to the 
Russian territorial integrity. He also warned that ―A victory for the separatist trends 
promoted by leaders of Chechen armed groups would trigger a domino effect in the 
region – the issue of territorial integrity of other countries in the region would arise‖ (as 
cited in Samii 2001, 55). Seeing that its neighbor Azerbaijan has the potential to instigate 
an Azeri‘s separate movement in Northwest, Iran was determined to not provide any 
precedent that would act as a catalyst for such a movement. An anti-Russian foreign 
policy toward the Chechen conflict would also make Russia not only stop the military 
assistance, but it would also pursue an anti-Iranian policy by sponsoring the separatist 
movements, especially the Azeri's movement. Thus, Iran also saw the cooperation with 
Russia as the best ways to forestall and suppress any potential separatist movement that 
would threaten its territorial integrity. 
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Chapter Nine 
Iran‘s Policy Toward Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict During the Post Soviet Era 
 The Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict is another crucial event in understanding the 
security and foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran. There are three main reasons 
for studying Iran‘s policy toward the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. First, both Armenia 
and Azerbaijan (Republic of Azerbaijan) are Iran‘s neighbors, which share land borders 
among each others. Iran and Azerbaijan border each other in the Caspian Sea and share 
about 611 kilometers of the land borders (Djalili 2002, 49-50). In addition, Iran borders 
the south of Armenia in a land borderline of 35 kilometers. The geostrategic location of 
Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Iran raised certain geopolitical issues, including pipelines, 
division of the Caspian Sea, Nagorno Karabakh region, and the issue of Southern 
Azerbaijan. All the above issues set the stage for other great powers to be involved in 
regional politics. For example, the pipeline issue created two main groups with opposing 
interests. On the one hand, there was the bloc created by the Azerbaijani cooperation with 
the U.S., Turkey, European Union, and Georgia. On the other hand, there was the bloc 
comprising Russia, Iran, and Armenia, who found their interests challenged by the first 
bloc. When it came to the division of the Caspian Sea, alliances changed and became 
very complicated. Azerbaijan allied with Russia, Turkey, U.S., and Kazakhstan, while 
Iran was left on the other side with Turkmenistan. However, it needs to be emphasized 
that Russia saw the Turkish and the U.S. involvement in this matter with deep suspicion 
and concerns. The Nagorno-Karabakh issue, which was the main cause of the Armenian-
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Azerbaijani conflict, created a new configuration of politics in the region and revealed the 
true nature of Iran‘s foreign policy toward both countries (analyzed below in this case 
study). 
Second, both the Republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan have been under the 
Iranian (Persian) domination for centuries. Armenia has been subject to conquests from 
the Persian Empire, starting with the conquests from Cyrus and Darius the Great and 
ending with conquests from the Safavid dynasty. Like Armenia, Azerbaijan has been part 
of the Persian Empire throughout the history, or of what was called the Greater Iran. 
However, during the Russo-Persian wars in the beginning of the 19th century, much of 
the Caucasus was occupied by the Russian troops and was formally ceded to Russia 
under the terms of the Treaties of Gulistan (1813) and Turkmenchay (1828) (mentioned 
earlier in the study). This event brought the creation of two ―Azerbaijans‖—the South 
and the North Azerbaijan. The North Azerbaijan became the Democratic Republic of 
Azerbaijan under the sovereignty of the Russian Empire. This part would declare its 
independence from the Russian domination in 1918, proclaiming the Azerbaijani 
Democratic Republic (ADR). However, in 1945, the new republic was invaded by the 
Soviet army and became part of the Soviet Empire. Azerbaijan restored its independence 
soon after the official demise of the Soviet Empire in late 1991. The Southern Azerbaijan 
was considered the Northwestern part of Iran populated by Azeris. Actually, there are 
more Azeris living in the Northwest Iran than are in the Republic of Azerbaijan (Freij 
1996, 73). There is a lack of consensus regarding the actual number of Azeris population 
in the northwest of Iran. Some researches indicate that Azeris comprise from one-fifth to 
one-third of the Iranian population, while the total number varies from twenty to twenty-
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seven million Azeris (Shaffer 2000, 473). 
 The third main reason to study Iran‘s policy toward Armenian-Azerbaijani 
conflict is the specific formation of the latter countries. At the time of the conflict, 
Armenia was predominantly a Christian country (approximately 95% of its population) 
and was characterized by uniqueness in religious practices and in spoken language. 
Despite their past engagements with each other, Armenian did not share much value and 
traditions with Iran. The majority of Armenians practiced an orthodox form of 
Christianity, and its church was named the Armenian Apostolic Church. It was the first 
nation to adopt Christianity as a state religion. On the other hand, Azerbaijan and Iran 
shared values from their mutual past and certain elements of a common culture. After 
Iran, Azerbaijan had the second largest Shi'i population in the world. The majority of the 
Azerbaijanis were of Turkic descend, and approximately 95% of its population was of the 
Muslim religion. Both countries were members of the Organization of Islamic 
Conference. Since 1918, Azerbaijani had been in a hostile and continuous conflict with 
its neighbor Armenia. 
 Just by looking at the demographics and the religious affiliations of both 
countries, we would assume that in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict the Islamic Iran 
would support its Muslim brothers in Azerbaijan. It was not a choice for Iran. It was a 
mandatory task given under the Islamic Constitution and a religious obligation to their 
fellow Muslims in need. Not only was Azerbaijan a Muslim country, but it was also 
fighting to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity.  
The conflict, as some may argue, had its roots in the awakening sense of identity 
that arose during the last years of the capitulation of the Ottoman Empire. The demise of 
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the Ottoman Empire set the stage for the promotion of the Pan-Turkism ideology, similar 
to the Gamal Abdel Nasser‘s Pan-Arabism. Pan-Turkism promoted a sense of national, 
linguistic, and historical commonality among the Turkic people (Croissant 1998, 8). The 
Armenians, on the other hand, began to create their own unique identity based on their 
history. Under the domination of the Ottoman Empire, they were considered by Turks as 
the ―pro-Western fifth column‖ and became subject to persecution. This led the Ottomans 
to implement their strategy of ―Armenian Question‖, which caused massive forced 
deportation of and massacres against the Armenian populace during 1895-1895 and 
1915-1916 periods (1998, 5). The massacre itself, the lack of support from the Christian 
Europe, and other previous conquests produced the Armenian sense of uniqueness, 
vulnerability, and self-reliance (1998, 5). At the same time, the Armenians perceived the 
Azerbaijanis as Turks and grew a sense of animosity toward them.  
The first confrontation between the Armenians and Azeris occurs in mid-1918 
when Armenians began a large-scale aggression against Azerbaijan. The cause of the 
conflict was the Azerbaijani province of Nagorno-Karabakh that was populated by a 
popular majority of the Armenian descends. The Nagorno-Karabakh region was under the 
sovereignty of the Republic of Azerbaijan. At that time, both countries had proclaimed 
their independence after the dissolution of the Transcaucasian Democratic Federative 
Republic (incorporating Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia). However, both countries 
were soon occupied by the 11th Red Army of Soviet Russia and the Soviet rule was 
established. The Soviet rule lasted until the official collapse of the Soviet Empire in late 
1991.  
The Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict was revived as a result of perestroika and 
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glasnost policies implemented in 1985 by the new general secretary of the Soviet Union, 
Mikhail Gorbachev. These policies provided more political freedom for citizens and 
groups to express their concerns and objections about political matters. This new policy 
motivated the Nagorno-Karabakh regional parliament to vote in favor of unifying the 
autonomous region with Armenia on February 20, 1988. This decision was in response to 
the Armenian claims that Azerbaijan‘s government was maltreating the Armenian 
population, forcing the latter to abandon their homes. At that time, Armenians comprised 
approximately 74% of the population of Nagorno-Karabakh (Melander 2001, 50). This 
decision led to a series of violent anti-Armenian protests in Baku (2001, 58-59). 
However, the conflict never escalated to an armed conflict between two republics 
because any border change would be in violation of the Article 78 of the Soviet 
Constitution. The Soviet leader was determined to apply this constitutional provision in 
this matter.  
The official collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 and the withdrawal of 
the Soviet troops from Karabakh (which was completed in March 1992) provided the 
Karabakh forces with arms and provoked an offensive in early 1992 (Migdalovitz 2003, 
3). On February 26, 1992, the Armenians seized the control of Khojaly, the second 
largest Azeri town in Karabakh. On March 6, the Azeri public outrage over Khojaly led 
to the ouster of the Azeri President. On May 9
th
, while Azerbaijan was caught by surprise 
and under a political turmoil, the Armenians seized the opportunity to take Shusha, the 
last Azeri town in Karabakh. Shusha fell to the Armenian rule while the Armenian 
president, Levon Ter-Petrosian was conducting peace talks with the acting Azerbaijani 
leader, Yaqub Mamedov, in Tehran (De Waal 2003, 180). The news from Karabakh 
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became an embarrassment for the Iranians and all the other parties in meeting as well. 
The capture of Shusha by the Armenians provoked a political chaos in Baku in which the 
government changed twice in 24 hours (Migdalovitz 2003, 3; De Waal 2003, 181). 
Meanwhile, the Armenians had also secured the ―Lachin corridor‖, a corridor joining 
Armenia and Karabakh. The Armenian offensive continued against Nakhichevan city, in 
which 30,000 people were displaced (Migdalovitz 2003, 3). In June 1992, Azerbaijan 
began an offensive to regain Karabakh province. By 1993, the Armenians engaged in a 
fierceful counteroffensive and managed to capture several villages in northern Karabakh.  
The conflict escalated and the Armenian attacks spread on the southern areas of 
Karabakh, resulting in a massive displacement of the Azeri population. On April 6, the 
U.N. Secretary General implied that there were indications that Armenian army was 
participating in the conflict. This statement forced the Armenian Defense Minister to 
admit that the Armenian forces had fired on the Azeri positions. The U.S. State 
Department identified that there was an unnecessary use of force by the Armenians in 
several occasions based on the pretext of self-defense (Migdalovitz 2003, 3).  
On July 29, the Security Council Resolution 853 condemned the Armenian 
conquests, demanded an immediate cease-fire and unconditional withdrawal of 
occupying forces, and appealed for direct negotiations within the Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) framework. It also urged Armenia to pressure 
Karabakh to comply. On August 18, the Security Council demanded cessation of fighting 
and withdrawal of occupying forces from Fizuli, Kelbajar, and Aghdam. In addition, the 
resolution called on Armenia to use its ―unique influence‖ to require a cease-fire and to 
ensure that forces involved were not provided with the means to extend their campaign 
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(2003, 4). On October 14, Security Council Resolution 874 called for a permanent cease-
fire, a withdrawal timetable, and removal of communication and transportation obstacles. 
The conflict continued until a cease-fire went into effect in May 1994. 
Meanwhile, Iran had prepared its strategy to respond to this conflict. Before the 
demise of the Soviet Empire (1998-1990), Iran did not interfere in the conflict and 
considered it an internal affair of the Soviets. However, the collapse of the Soviet Empire 
brought a new era of politics in the region. The dissolution was followed by the creation 
of the new independent states of Armenia and Azerbaijan. Previously, Iran and 
Azerbaijan had stable and friendly relations. However, after the declaration of the 
independence by Azerbaijan, Iran became concerned about the links between its Northern 
Azeri population and the new republic. In January 1993, Iran's Ministry of Interior, 
General Foreign Citizen and Emigration Affairs Office, announced that ―any Iranian 
citizen intending to marry a citizen from Azerbaijan must get a permit from the Ministry 
of Interior‖ (Freij 1996, 72-73). 
Throughout the conflict, Iran promoted a foreign policy that endeavored to 
contain the impact of the conflict outside Iran‘s borders. Many believed that Iran‘s policy 
toward the conflict would be neutral due to domestic and international pressure from both 
sides (Gresh 2006, 4). However, the situation proved that neutrality was not the case. The 
conflict caused a massive displacement of the Azerbaijani population to its neighboring 
Iran. By the beginning of 1993, Iran mobilized military troops to its northern borders and 
provided humanitarian aid to feed the Azerbaijani refugees. In addition, Iran built refugee 
camps within Azerbaijan‘s borders. By building refugee camps within the Azerbaijani 
territory, the Iranian authorities aimed at preventing the rise of any possible sense of 
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affinity between the Azerbaijani refugees and the Azeris living in the northwest of Iran.  
In addition, aware of the impact of the conflict, Iran attempted to negotiate a 
ceasefire in 1992. However, this attempt failed due to the intensification of fighting 
between the Azerbaijani and Armenian troops. Meanwhile, Iran was faced with a fierce 
anti-Iranian rhetoric and calls for Azerbaijani unification coming from the newly-elected 
president of Azerbaijan, Abulfez Elchibey. Iran opposed Azerbaijan and its new anti-
Iranian policies by aligning itself with Armenia. By the end of 1992, Iran and Armenia 
signed a bilateral treaty of friendship and economic cooperation (Gresh 2006, 5). 
 
Rumors 
were spread that Iran had allowed the transit of weapons from Russia headed to Armenia 
during the conflict. It was also reported that Iran trained the Armenian secret army forces, 
which were directly involved in the conflict (2006, 5). The Iranian-Armenian relations 
reached the pinnacle when Iran provided economic assistance to Armenia during the 
trade embargo imposed on Armenia by Turkey and Azerbaijan in 1994.  
But what are the forces driving Iran‘s policy toward the Armenia-Azerbaijan 
conflict? For Iran, the collapse of the Soviet Empire and the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict 
inflicted a sense of fear regarding the Iranian role in the region and the security threat that 
these events pose to the Iranian sovereignty. The demise of the Soviet Empire signaled a 
new configuration of powers in the region. After breaking relations with the United States 
and the fall of communism, Iran lost the privileged status that it had had for the 
containment of Communism in the Middle East. The demise of Communism led to the 
birth of another regional ideology—pan-Turkism. Many began to envision a federation of 
all Turkic people, extending from Turkey to Himalayas (Hunter 2003, 137). A Turkic 
hegemony in the region would severely jeopardize Iran‘s regional interests and 
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ambitions. It would cause a chain reaction that would later challenge even the sovereignty 
and the territorial integrity of the Islamic state of Iran. Iran feared that pan-Turkism might 
motivate the Azeri minority of Turkic descend in the northern Iran to demand secession 
from the Islamic state.  
To make the matter worse, Iran feared that the newly independent Republic of 
Azerbaijan could claim the rights over the Azeri province in northern Iran, or what the 
latter called the Southern Azerbaijan. This fear of insecurity and national unrest became a 
real concern for Iran in 1992 when Abulfez Elchibey, a nationalist and anti-Iranian, 
became the president of Azerbaijan. Elchibey publicly declared his government‘s 
aspiration for unification with the Southern Azerbaijan (Souleimanov and Ditrych 2007, 
104; Gresh 2006, 4). He supported the idea of the Greater Azerbaijan, which holds that 
the Azerbaijani national unity was split into northern and southern halves by imperial 
Russia and Iran and should therefore reunite (Sadegh-Zadeh 2008, 38). Iran also feared 
that this situation could lead to separatist movement by the Azeri minority (which 
comprises about 24% of the Iranian population) to secede from Iran and join the Republic 
of Azerbaijan. This would not end here. The Iranian authorities also thought that a 
potential Azeri separatist movement might serve as an incentive for separatist movements 
from Arabs in South (3% of the Iranian population), Kurds in West (7%), Turkmen (2%) 
in Northeast, and Baluchis (2%) in Southeast of Iran (Sadegh-Zadeh 2008, 36).  
Besides the impact of the Azeris separatist movements, Iran feared a possible 
involvement of the neighboring states and the U.S. in destabilizing and weakening Iran. 
Iran feared that Turkey might assume, under the support and blessing from the United 
States, the role that Iran had previously maintained in the Middle East during the Shah 
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era. The history had given Iran all the reasons to fear other states and look at their 
intentions with suspicion. Saddam attacked the Islamic Iran in 1980 motivated primarily 
by his desire to make Iraq a regional hegemony. The attack happened in a time when Iran 
was perceived as less powerful and after U.S. has stopped its weaponry assistance to Iran. 
Twelve years later, Iran feared that history might repeat itself.   
In addition, Iran‘s policy toward the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict was shaped by 
Iran‘s need to have close relationship with Russia. From this perspective, the Iranian 
policy toward this conflict had the same goals as the Iranian policy toward the Russia-
Chechnya conflict, as analyzed previously. Iran considered Russia a crucial force to 
contain and confront the Turkish and U.S. influence in the region. At the same time, 
Russia was Iran‘s primary source of weaponry assistance. Nothing was more important 
for Iran than building of military capabilities. Iran was aware of what other states, like 
Russia or Armenia, were gaining from the cooperation with it. However, the Iranian 
officials believed that by enhancing military capabilities through cooperation, they would 
maximize their relative gains. Iran also believed that the balance of power served Iran‘s 
long-term interests. Iran was not concerned about short-term gains. What mattered the 
most for Iran was becoming a potential regional hegemony in the future. A hegemonic 
status would provide Iran with more security and leverage on regional and global issues. 
To reach the hegemonic status, Iran needed a strong state, a solid army, and a modern and 
abundant military arsenal. Russia was considered a strategic partner to achieve this goal. 
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Chapter Ten 
Iran‘s Policy Toward the U.S. Invasion of Iraq 
―...wherever Iran goes, it faces the United States. This includes Iraq.‖  
Hassan Rowhani, Iranian Nuclear Negotiator 
―That is right, but there is another side to it. Wherever the U.S. goes, it faces Iran.‖   
Hussein Mousavian, Iranian Nuclear Negotiator (arrested in 2007 on espionage charges) 
 The Iranian security and foreign policy in the Middle East cannot be fully 
comprehended without taking into account the U.S. policy in the region. There are three 
main reasons why the U.S. and Iranian security and foreign policy are so intertwined and 
interdependent on each other. 
1. U.S. is the only state to have an indisputable military capability and influence 
in the Middle East policy. 
2. U.S. represents the most serious threat to the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
3. After the fall of Saddam Hussein, Iran sees itself as the most influential actor 
and as a potential regional hegemony for in the future. 
The coup d‘état perpetrated by the U.S. and British secret services against the 
Iranian government of Mohammed Mosaddeq in 1953 consolidated the U.S. hegemony in 
the Middle East for decades to come. Through this coup d‘état, the U.S sought to achieve 
two main goals: (1) control over Iran‘s petroleum and (2) containment of the Soviet 
expansion (Communism) in the Middle East. Besides the interests in the oil-rich field of 
the region and the containment of Communism, its support to the state of Israel provided 
another important reason for the U.S. presence in the Middle East.  
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Despite the oil crises in 1973, the U.S. interests remained unchallenged until the 
coming of the Iranian Islamic Revolution. The coming into power of the Islamic forces 
caught U.S. by surprise and changed its regional policy for decades to come. In addition, 
the hostage crises and the labeling of the United States by Ayatollah Khomeini as the 
Great Satan stunned and humiliated the American government. Both countries entered in 
a fierce battle of demonizing each other, one naming the other ―Great Satan‖ and member 
of the ―axis of evil‖. The Islamic Republic of Iran saw the U.S. as the most serious threat 
to its existence and interests in the Middle East. The United States, on the other hand, 
saw the Islamic Iran as a threat to its security and economic interests in the region.  
However, the regional politics (and global politics as well) changed radically and 
profoundly after the U.S. invasion of Iraq (may call it also ―U.S. involvement in Iraq‖) in 
2003 and the fall of the regime of Saddam Hussein. Rightfully, many analysts would 
raise several questions about the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Why did U.S. invade Iraq and not 
Iran? What may be the reasons behind this invasion, especially after it was revealed in 
2002 that Iran was secretly engaged in a nuclear activity? Were the U.S. foreign relations 
experts ignorant about regional politics in the Middle East and relations between Iraq and 
Iran? While taking into account these questions, this case study will focus on the Iranian 
security and foreign policy toward the U.S. invasion of Iraq. 
The Americans government tried to convince its people and the international 
community that the reason for invading Iraq was the possession of nuclear weapons by 
Saddam. However, a reasonable analysis would conclude that it would be almost 
impossible for a country to attack another country that possesses nuclear capabilities. If 
such an attack were to be conducted, then both countries would risk entering in a mutual 
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assured destruction (MAD) process. Thus, logically, it would be impossible for the 
Congress to vote for a war whose consequences would remind the international 
community of the nuclear bombardment of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. They would 
probably fear an Iraqi nuclear attack against Israel in case of an American attack on Iraq. 
Indeed, the U.S. invasion of Iraq can be considered a preemptive attack which aimed at 
disarming Iraq and limiting its capabilities to create a nuclear arsenal. In addition, the 
U.S. officials may have feared that a nuclear Iraq might serve as a weaponry supporter 
for the Al Qaida terrorists. The Americans also feared that Iraq might turn into a safe 
haven for the Al Qaeda, from where the anti-American strategies would be launched. 
Some may argue that the U.S. invasion of Iraq aimed at disturbing the balance of power 
between Sunnis and Shi‘as. By doing this, U.S. would attempt to curtail the anti-
American activity of the Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East. It could be done by 
providing more power to Shi‘as, which are a minority in the Muslim world. However, 
any of these scenarios does not indicate that the U.S.-Iran relations are friendly or 
peaceful. Both U.S and Iran were playing to promote and protect their interests in the 
region. U.S. was aware of the Iran-Iraq relations and Iran‘s ambitions in the region.  
As expected, the U.S. invasion of Iraq was followed by the coming into power of 
Shi‘a-dominated government in Iraq. Nothing has better served the Iranian regional 
interests and none (besides the Iraqi people, especially Shi'a population) has profit more 
from this invasion than the Islamic government of Iran. Iran saw this as an opportunity to 
expand its influence and power in the region. As Vali Nasr argues, ―The Shi‘a 
ascendancy in Iraq is supported by and is in turn bolstering another important 
development in the Middle East: the emergence of Iran as a regional power‖ (Nasr, 
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2007, p. 212). Years after the deposition of Saddam Hussein and the coming into power 
of the Shi‘a forces, many analysts believe that Iraq is becoming a satellite of Iran and a 
battleground for the U.S.-Iran confrontation.  
The Iranian secret nuclear program discovered in 2002, followed by the new 
opportunities coming from the destruction Iraq and its Sunni-led government, provides 
clear indication why U.S. feared the Iranian politics and its quest to become a regional 
hegemony. As an offshore balancer, U.S. would do everything to stop Iran from reaching 
the hegemonic status in the region. With Saddam out of the political scene, U.S. is now 
focused primarily on Iran. An Iranian hegemony would challenge and decrease the U.S. 
influence in the Middle East, would threaten the U.S. historical ally, Israel, and would 
profoundly alternate the balance of power in the region. Thus, the argument stands that 
Iran,s security and foreign policy toward the U.S. invasion of Iraq was(is) influenced by 
its need to survive, the desire to become a regional hegemony, and the threat that U.S. 
imposes on its regime survival and its ambitions to become a regional hegemony.  
The Iranian policy toward the U.S. invasion of Iraq provides a fundamental 
support and explanation for this argument. In order to succeed in its security and foreign 
policy agenda, and in addition to increasing its military capabilities, Iran implemented 
two other main strategies: (1) the prevention of coming into power of Sunni forces, and 
(2) lowering of the U.S. influence and power in the region. Iran was enhancing its 
military capabilities by conducting ―asymmetric, low-intensity wars‖, modernizing its 
weapons systems, developing ―indigenous‖ missile and antimissile systems, and 
developing a nuclear program (Milani 2009).  
Furthermore, the American invasion of Iraq and the fall of Saddam Hussein 
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brought opportunities for the Islamic Iran to influence the political process within Iraq. 
Soon after the fall of Saddam Hussein, Iran promoted an agenda to join all Iraqi Shi‘ite 
factions in a cohesive group to participate in the post Bathist election process. For this 
purpose, Iran managed to assemble all the factions in a Shiite Islamic bloc called United 
Iraqi Alliance. The bloc encompasses the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), the 
Da‟wa (Islamic Call) party, and the faction of the young cleric Moqtada Al Sadr.  Iran's 
goal was to take advantage of Iraqi's Shiite majority population and turn it into a source 
of political power to control the state apparatus. The election results proved that the 
Iranian strategy had worked: the bloc won 128 of the 275 seats in the December 15, 2005, 
election for a full term parliament (Katzman, 2008, p. 1). The profile of the political 
figures coming out of this election showed that they all had direct or indirect ties with 
Iran. Nuri al-Maliki, who was selected as Prime Minister, was from the Da‟wa Party, 
whose leaders were in exile mostly in Syria. Most leaders of ISCI had spent their years of 
exile in Iran. In 1982, Ayatollah Mohammad Baqr Al Hakim, leader of ISCI, who was 
killed in an August 2003 car bomb in Najaf, was anointed by then Iranian leader 
Ayatollah Khomeini to head a future ―Islamic Republic of Iraq‖ (Duss and Juul, 2009, p. 
10).  
In addition to enhancing its military capabilities and taking the control of the Iraqi 
state, Iran put significant emphasis on its strategy of gaining power and weakening the 
American military power and influence in the region by using military and paramilitary 
groups. Iran also found it vital for its interests and security to not allow any permanent 
establishment of the U.S. military bases in Iraq. Permanent U.S. military bases in Iraq 
would be a permanent threat to Iran‘s national security and fortifications for the U.S. 
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military forces in the Middle East. This led Iran to consider several strategies to enhance 
its security status and to diminish the U.S. political and military power. 
 In his theory of offensive realism, John Mearsheimer argues that there are four 
main strategies through which a state can gain power relative to the others. First, 
countries gain power by going to war with the other rival state. In our case, Iran could not 
implement this strategy because it has no chance of winning a war against the U.S. 
mighty military forces. Second, states gain power by threatening rival states to use 
military forces against them--‖blackmail‖. Iran didn‘t even think about this strategy 
because it did not have sufficient military capabilities to challenge the U.S. military 
power. Third, the bait and bleed strategy causes to rivals to engage in a ―protracted war‖, 
so that ―they bleed each other white, while the baiter remains on sideline with its military 
strength intact‖ (Mearsheimer, 2001, pp. 147-155). This is the case when one state causes 
other states to go in war with each other and the ―baiter‖ would be free in the future to 
expand its power. As mentioned previously, the U.S. invasion of Iraq was not provoked 
or instigated by Iran. It was a result of the U.S. fear of Iraq running nuclear facilities and 
supporting terrorism. The last strategy that states implement to gain power is the 
bloodletting strategy, which aims at causing rival states to fight against each other in a 
long and costing conflict.  
This last strategy best describes the Iranian strategy in Iraq. First, Iran did not 
have any implication in starting the invasion, but just benefited from it. Second, a long 
and costing conflict would weaken the American power in the region and would keep 
Iraq in ruins for decades to come. Thus, by promoting this strategy, Iran ―killed two birds 
with one stone‖: (1) kept Iraq out of competition for regional hegemonic power, which 
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may also turn in a servant of Iran's ambitions, and (2) kept America ―bleeding‖, resulting 
in declining of its regional political and military influence. 
Following the above strategy of ―bloodletting‖, Iran provided political and 
military support to ISCI‘s militia, the ―Badr Brigades‖. The Badr Brigades had been 
recruited, trained, and armed by Iran‘s Revolutionary Guard, the most politically 
powerful actor of Iran‘s military during the Iran-Iraq war and in the current Iran 
(Katzman, 2008, p. 1). In addition, the Iranian leaders have sought to establish close 
relationship with Sadr‘s faction, a large and dedicated following among lower-class Iraqi 
Shiites, and which built an estimated 60,000 person ―Mahdi Army‖ (Jaysh al-Mahdi, or 
JAM) militia after Saddam‘s fall (2008, p. 2). JAM became very aggressive toward the 
U.S. troops and the pro-U.S. Iraqi's politicians. In most occasions, they would try to 
eliminate pro-American politicians. Iran soon realized that JAM would be the best 
political and military group through which Iran could gain power,  prevent U.S. from 
establishing its hegemony and military settlements, and help Iran in any possible Iran-
U.S. confrontation. In 2005, Iran began supplying arms to the JAM through the 
Revolutionary Guard‘s ―Qods (Jerusalem) Force,‖ the unit that assists Iranian protégé 
forces abroad (2008, p. 2).  
Moreover, Iran‘s arming and training of Shiite militias in Iraq had been in 
continuation of the U.S.-Iran tensions over Iran‘s nuclear program and regional 
ambitions, such as its aid to Lebanese Hezbollah and the Palestinian organization Hamas 
(2008, p. 3). For example, the U.S. officials had provided specific information on Qods 
Force and Hezbollah aid to the Iraqi Shiite militias, but without detailed number of the 
operatives. The Qods Force officers were not combatant forces. Their main task was to 
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identify Iraqi trainees and create traffic route for weapon shipment into Iraq. In addition, 
in his report to the members and committees of Congress, Kenneth Katzman, Specialist 
in Middle Eastern Affairs for the Congressional Research Service, provided the 
following information about the Iran support for armed groups: 
On February 11, 2007, U.S. military briefers in Baghdad provided what 
they said was specific evidence that Iran had supplied armor-piercing 
“explosively formed projectiles” (EFPs) to Shiite (Sadrist) militiamen. EFPs 
have been responsible for over 200 U.S. combat deaths since 2003. In August 
2007, Gen. Raymond Odierno, then the second in command and who in mid-
September 2008 will become overall commander in Iraq, said that Iran had 
supplied the Shiite militias with 122 millimeter mortars that are used to fire on 
the Green Zone in Baghdad. On August 28, 2008, the Washington Times 
reported that pro-Sadr militias were now also using “Improvised Rocket 
Assisted Munitions” — a “flying bomb” carrying 100 pounds of explosives, 
propelled by Iranian-supplied 107 mm rockets. On July 2, 2007, Brig. Gen. 
Kevin Bergner said that Lebanese Hezbollah was assisting the Qods Force in 
aiding Iraqi Shiite militias, adding that Iran gives about $3 million per month to 
these Iraqi militias. He based the statement on the March 2007 capture of 
former Sadr aide Qais Khazali and Lebanese Hezbollah operative Ali Musa 
Daqduq. They were allegedly involved in the January 2007 killing of five U.S. 
forces in Karbala. (2008, p. 3) 
 To the above information can be added the testimony of General David Petraeus 
on April 8-9, 2008, who stated that Iran continues to arm, train, and direct ―Special 
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Groups‖ – radical and possibly breakaway elements of the JAM — and to organize the 
Groups into a ―Hezbollah-like force to serve Iran‘s interests and fight a proxy war 
against the Iraqi state and coalition forces...‖ (as cited in Katzman, 2008, p. 3). His 
testimony culminated in his briefing to the press on October 7, 2007 when Gen. Petraeus 
told journalists that Iran‘s Ambassador to Iraq, Hassan Kazemi-Qomi, was himself a 
member of the Qods Force (Yates, 2007). Despite these revelations, nothing changed the 
Iranian policy toward the U.S. involvement in Iraq. 
Thus, the use of the armed groups against the U.S. forces and any other threat to 
the Iranian security and interests shows that the Iranian regional hegemonic policy not 
only was based on field operatives but was orchestrated by its high-ranking officials with 
clear strategies in mind. The Islamic government of Iran considered the United States a 
serious threat to its regime and national security and interests. The Iranians were aware 
of the military power of the U.S and the impact that it would have if the Americans 
established permanent military bases in Iraq. Permanent U.S. military bases in Iraq 
would mean permanent threat to Iran‘s national security and interests in the region. For 
these reasons, Iran implemented political and military strategies to diminish and obstruct 
the U.S. military influence and presence in the region. At the same time, in order to 
increase its influence in the region, Iran has also continued the modernization of the 
armed forces and the growth of its military arsenal. During an army parade on April 18, 
2009, the Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad stated that "The power of the 
Iranian armed forces is at the service of the nations ... and will help to preserve the 
region's security and stability" (Dahl 2009). 
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Chapter Eleven 
Conclusion and Policy Implications 
 The case studies analyzed above indicate that Iran‘s security and foreign policy 
during the post-Shah era is driven by its paramount need for survival and its quest for 
regional hegemony in the Middle East. There are no major policy differences between the 
today‘s Iran, the Iran we have seen throughout its history, and any state in the 
international community. Iran behaves like any other state in the international system. 
The Iran-Iraq war revealed that both countries possessed significant military capabilities 
that could harm each other. It was the shift in the balance of power favoring Iraq and its 
desire to become a regional hegemony that created the premises for Iraq to attack Iran.  
In addition, the attack enforced the assumption that states can never be certain 
about the intentions of the other states, even after signing agreements like the 1975 
Algiers Agreement. Furthermore, Iran's ultimate ideology of survival dominated any other 
ideological predisposition. The need for survival led leaders of the Islamic Iran to 
entering in secret negotiations with countries they considered the Great and the Small 
Satans. These negotiations helped Iran increase its military capabilities in order to 
survive the Iraqi invasion.  
In addition, during the Russian-Chechen conflict, Iran sided with the Christian 
Russia and considered the conflict an ―internal affair‖. Iran calculated and feared that a 
support for its Muslim brothers in Chechnya would cause Russia to stop providing 
military assistance and military-related technology that Iran so desperately needed. In 
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addition, in supporting the Chechen separatist movement, Iran would inadvertently 
encourage the Azeri separatist movement in Northwestern Iran. Iran also feared that 
Russia, in retaliation, would support the separatist movements in Iran. Thus, the main 
strategy leading the security and foreign policy of the Islamic Iran toward the Russian-
Chechen conflict was to enhance its military capabilities and to prevent any separatist 
movements across. The paramount goal leading to this strategy was the survival of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran, its sovereignty, and the ambition to become hegemony. 
Moreover, during the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, the Islamic Iran sided with the 
Christian Armenians rather than with its Muslim brothers in Azerbaijan. This policy was 
due to Iran‘s fear that the newly independent Republic of Azerbaijan could claim the 
rights over the Azeri province in the northern Iran, or what they called the Southern 
Azerbaijan. In addition, Iran feared a possible involvement of the neighboring states and 
of the U.S. in destabilizing and weakening Iran. Iran feared that Turkey might assume, 
under the support and blessing from the United States, the role that Iran had previously 
maintained in the Middle East during the Shah era. Finally, Iran‘s policy toward the 
Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict was shaped by Iran‘s need to have close relationship with its 
strategic partner, Russia.  
Finally, during the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the Islamic government of Iran launched 
strategies which aimed at diminishing and obstructing the U.S. military influence and 
presence in the region. Iran considered the United States a serious threat to its regime and 
national security and interests. The Iranians were aware of the military power of the U.S 
and the impact that it would have if the Americans established permanent military bases 
in Iraq. Permanent U.S. military bases in Iraq would mean permanent threat to Iran‘s 
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national security and interests in the region.  
Referring to the above case studies, we may realize that Iran sees the intentions of 
other states with deep suspicions. For example, Iran sees the U.S. foreign policy more as 
a threat to its regime survival rather than a behavior change. The Iranian past history of 
occupations from foreigner states, especially the modern Iraq—Iran war of 1980s, make 
Iran more suspicious of states‘ intentions. Iran has come to realize that in an anarchic 
international system of politics, survival through self-help is all what matters. The 
ultimate ideology of survival is superior to any other ideology. Iran also believes that in 
order to survive, a state should have formidable military capabilities and endeavor to 
shift the balance of power based on its interests. The nuclear program would give Iran a 
regional hegemonic status, ensured survival, deterrence power, and bargaining power 
over regional and global matters. Thus, Iran is not different from other states within the 
international system. It bases its security and foreign policy on a rational choice analysis. 
  However, Iran should be aware of constraints that the international system puts 
on its behavior. Iran should also be aware of the fact that U.S and Russia behave the 
same way as Iran does. Thus, neither U.S. nor Russia would accept a nuclear Iran. A 
nuclear Iran would challenge the U.S. interests in the region and would seriously 
jeopardize the territorial security of its neighboring Russia. In order to prevail, Iran 
should implement certain policies that would allow it to reach its goals. Having put the 
international community and the U.S. policy in an uncertain position, the Iranian 
government should send a message to the global community indicating that it is willing 
to cooperate and talk about its nuclear activity. In addition, seeing that the 
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) does not prohibit Iran from pursuing nuclear capability 
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for economic purpose, it is imperative for Iran to lower its rhetoric against the state of 
Israel and focus on the legal aspect of its nuclear activity. Iran has to realize that there is 
no great power in the international system that would accept another nuclear power. 
Thus, is should aim at building its nuclear capability, while the others will try to stop this 
from happening. However, Iran should not push too hard for this goal because it may risk 
an attack from U.S. and other powers. Israel also would be in alert and willing to take 
unilateral actions against Iran in case of a perceived and imminent threat.  
The best way for Iran to pursue its goal is to use the current balance of power to 
achieve its goal. This means that Iran may use its policy to have other powers 
confronting each other. For example, Iran may find a way or a strategy to put Russia, 
China, and U.S. in different positions and pursuing different interests, while not ignoring 
the influence of other states in the region. This will make them reach no consensus over 
Iran‘s nuclear program. A consensus among great powers regarding Iran‘s nuclear 
activity would be very unfortunate for Iran. In addition, Iran should pursue a regional 
policy of cooperation with other countries in the region. It should not publicly call for the 
overthrown of other regimes but should implement the strategy of ―divide and conquer‖. 
Iran may also continue the use of the bait and bleed and bloodletting strategies of gaining 
power. Iran must also be careful that its strategies do not compromise or jeopardize its 
domestic base of support. 
 Regarding the American, Israeli, Russian approach toward Iran, it is imperative to 
understand and assume that Iran‘s goal is to become a regional hegemony and build a 
nuclear arsenal. In confronting Iran, U.S. should be cautious to not fall in the trap of the 
Iranian policy and portray itself as the ―police of the world‖. To reach this goal, U.S. 
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should provide incentives for the engagement of the international community in Middle 
East issues. One particular strategy should focus on dealing with a productive 
engagement of great powers like Russia and China. The goal is to use the United Nation 
(through the Security Council) as the main actor dealing with Iran. U.S. should 
emphasize concerns about the Iranian nuclear activity and provide benefits for these 
powers in case they succeed in stopping Iran.  
In addition, U.S. should use regional states to force Iran stop its nuclear activity. 
It should emphasize that a nuclear Iran is a threat to all states in the region. The best 
strategy would be the formation of an anti-nuclear-Iran regional coalition. Finally, U.S. 
should use the domestic factions in Iran to gain more intelligence and to decelerate the 
pace of the nuclear activity. One example is the decision of the European Union to take 
the People‟s Mojahideen Organization (PMOI) of Iran off the list of terrorist 
organization and unfreeze its assets. As staunch opponent of the Iranian theocratic 
regime, PMOI has promised to provide (and has provided) intelligence regarding the 
Iran‘s nuclear activity and help overthrow the regime. Regardless of the circumstances, 
both U.S. and Iran will not abandon their paramount goals. Iran will not stop pursuing its 
ultimate ideology of survival and the need (quest) to be a regional hegemony. U.S. just 
cannot accept a regional hegemony in the Middle East that would threatened its regional 
and global status. Meanwhile, Russia will support Iran to that extent that Iran itself does 
not become a threat to the security and interests of Russia. Russia will continue to 
provide nuclear support to Iran as a way to challenge the U.S. interests in the Middle 
East, but it will never allow Iran to have a nuclear weapon. Facing U.S. and Russia, Iran 
should play the role that it once played with Russia and Great Britain in the nineteenth 
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century. Meanwhile, Iran should be cautious to not promote policies that would cause 
U.S. and Russia to cooperate with each other. 
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